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TAXATION AND SURVEILLANCE: AN AGENDA 
Michael Hatfield * 
 
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319 (2015) 
 
 
The IRS has always been an information 
intensive enterprise. But it’s the organization of 
data and ultimately the knowledge and 
intelligence we extract from the information we 
receive that really matters. It can show us the 
areas of greatest non-compliance . . . and 
thereby, contributes to more efficient and 
effective compliance programs. 
– IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman (2011)1 
 
Every animate and inanimate object on earth 
will soon be generating data, including our 
homes, our cars, and, yes, even our bodies. 
– THE HUMAN FACE OF BIG DATA (2012)2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Among government agencies, the IRS likely has the surest 
legal claim to the most information about the most Americans: 
their hobbies, religious affiliations, reading activities, travel, 
and medical information are all potentially tax relevant. 
Privacy scholars have studied the arrival of Big Data, the 
internet-of-things, and the cooperation of private companies 
with the government in surveillance, but neither privacy nor 
tax scholars have considered how these technological advances 
should impact the U.S. tax system. As government agencies 
and private companies increasingly pursue what has been 
described as the “growing gush of data,” the use of these 
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technologies in tax administration will become increasingly 
important to consider. This Article provides an agenda of items 
for discussion, debate, and research related to the development, 
implementation, and effects of a surveillance-facilitated tax 
system. 
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Introduction 
Although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) “has always 
been an information intensive agency,” 3  its information-
gathering has never been the focus of privacy scholars. Those 
                                                 
3  Schulman, supra note 1. 
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scholars have instead focused on agencies such as the National 
Security Administration (NSA).4 But the IRS’s legal claim to 
private information is remarkable. It is entitled to collect 
information about who sleeps how often in your house,5 your 
hobbies,6 your reading preferences,7 your religious affiliation,8 
your travel plans, 9  your weight and your doctor’s 
recommendations about it,10 your spouse or your dependent’s 
abortion, sterilization,11  or gender identity disorder,12  and if 
                                                 
4  See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative 
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) [hereinafter Gray & Citron, 
Quantitative Privacy]; Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing 
the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 262 (2013) [hereinafter Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance]; 
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 
(2013). 
5  This information may be relevant to determining tax consequences of 
payments to a separated spouse who is living in the house and 
dependency status in the case of a child. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (West 2014) 
(defining alimony payments to a separated spouse who is in the same 
household as not excludable from income); I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (West 
2014) (defining a qualifying child as a dependent residing at the same 
principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the 
year); and Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971) (defining the dependent 
including special circumstances of absences of less than 6 months). 
6  See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1 (1972) (listing factors for determining if an 
activity is a hobby for which losses are not deductible). 
7  Reading habits may be relevant, for example, to determine whether or not 
one has undertaken an activity with a motive of making a profit. See, e.g., 
Nickerson v. Comm’r, 700 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that facts 
including a taxpayer’s reading about farming were evidence that he 
pursued that activity with a profit-seeking motive). 
8  Not only may financial support of religious organizations be tax relevant, 
but also the distance from a taxpayer’s home to any of her religious 
organizations. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (West 2014) (covering charitable 
contributions and gifts to a church or convention or association of 
churches); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b) (2002) (stating that location of religious 
organization with which taxpayer affiliates is relevant to determining 
principal residence for gain exclusion). 
9  For example, was the travel for personal, business, educational, or 
medical purposes—or some combination? I.R.C § 213(d)(1)-(d)(2) (West 
2014) (stating that transportation and lodging expenses for medical care 
are deductible); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1960) (covering travel for business, 
mixed business, and personal reasons); and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967) 
(covering travel as a form of education). 
10  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-04-111 (Oct. 31, 1979) (setting out weight loss 
program fees as deductible where prescribed by physicians for the 
alleviation of specific ailments); Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (noting 
that weight loss program fees are not deductible even though physician-
recommended where not prescribed for the alleviation of specific ailment). 
11  See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (deeming legal abortions and 
vasectomies deductible medical care under I.R.C. § 213). 
12  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (deeming breast 
reconstruction following mastectomy to be deductible). But see 
O'Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. No. 4 (2010) (finding that hormone 
therapy and sex reassignment surgery are deductible expenses to treat 
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you were considering a carnal quid pro quo when you made a 
gift to your “mistress.”13 Yet, privacy scholars have taken no 
note of the IRS’s extraordinary legal claim to such information. 
From the reverse angle, despite the information-intensive 
aspects of tax law, tax scholars have not taken note of the 
increasing pervasiveness of information technology.14 Modern 
technologies are creating “minutely detailed records” of our 
existence,15 increasingly facilitating the “persistent, continuous 
and indiscriminate monitoring of our daily lives.” 16  One 
information privacy scholar described the radical and 
technological transformation of personal information: 
The small details that were once captured in dim 
memories or fading scraps of paper are now 
preserved forever in the digital minds of 
computers, vast databases with fertile fields  
of personal data . . . . Every day, rivulets of 
information stream into electronic brains to be 
sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined in 
hundreds of different ways. Technology enables 
the preservation of the minutia of our everyday 
comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of 
who we are and what we are . . . . It is ever  
more possible to create an electronic collage that 
covers much of a person’s life—a life captured in 
records, a digital biography composed in the 
collective computer networks of the world.17 
A prominent national security advisor has predicted that by 
2040, all of our daily activities will be known by “governmental 
                                                                                                             
“gender identity disorder” disease, but that breast augmentation was 
merely cosmetic and not a deductible expense). 
13  Transfers to a sexual partner may be characterized as either non-taxable 
gifts or as taxable compensation for sexual activity. See, e.g., United 
States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131-1135 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the 
“current law on the tax treatment of payments to mistresses”). 
14  Tax scholars have not considered the relevance to tax administration of 
the Big Data revolution, the rise of the internet-of-things, or other aspects 
of the information technology revolution. While some scholars have 
addressed “tax privacy,” their primary focus is determining the conditions 
for IRS disclosure of individual income tax return information. See, e.g., 
Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 
265 (2011); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will 
Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance? 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 1 
(2005); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the 
Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 951 (1990); and Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy 
and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065 (2002).     
15   Richards, supra note 4, at 1934. 
16   Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance, supra note 4 at 274. 
17  Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:  Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001). 
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and corporate entities” pursuing the “growing gush of data” 
from the “internet of things.”18 As we move towards such a 
future, the IRS most likely will be among those entities 
pursuing this growing gush of data. This Article suggests an 
agenda for discussion among privacy and tax law scholars: 
issues we ought to consider, research we ought to pursue, and 
debates we ought to have. 
 In Part I of this Article, I describe the flow of tax-relevant 
information from taxpayers and third parties to the IRS. I 
point out two significant problems in that information flow: the 
compliance burden and the compliance gap. In Part II, I predict 
that, over the next twenty-five years, surveillance technologies 
will be used to reduce the compliance burden and gap. I 
consider the technological and political factors that may pave 
or block the way for such an increase in surveillance to improve 
tax administration. In Part III, I recommend a research agenda 
in an effort to make the integration of surveillance into tax 
administration more beneficial than harmful. Ultimately, 
reforming tax law to fit the emerging technology and our 
privacy expectations will be essential to integrating the 
information technology revolution into tax administration 
without disrupting the administration itself. 
 
I.  The Tax Information Flow and Gap 
In this Part, I describe the information needed to prepare 
and file an individual’s income tax return. The IRS is legally 
entitled to a great deal of information from a taxpayer. But in 
practice, very little information is turned over, mostly due to 
the extremely low audit rate of less than one percent. 19  
The tax-return-preparation burden on individuals is quite 
substantial, amounting to about 7.6 billion work hours a year.20 
And about $450 billion of tax revenue is lost each year due to 
taxpayers’ failure to comply with the tax law.21 Both of these 
problems are ameliorated when third parties provide tax-
relevant information to both the taxpayers and the IRS. Thus, 
third-party reporting of information has become essential to 
the administration of the individual income tax. In Section A, I 
describe the current system of providing individual income tax 
information to the IRS.22 In Section B, I highlight problems 
                                                 
18  Richard Clarke, Richard Clarke on the Future of Privacy: Only the Rich 
Will Have It, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/rich 
ard-clarke-on-the-future-of-privacy-only-the-rich-will-have-it-1404762349. 
19  See infra note 29. 
20  See infra notes 80-81. 
21  See infra note 100. 
22 I am concerned only with the individual income tax, which is the single 
largest source of revenue for collection and returns for processing by the 
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that reflect the information gap between the taxpayer and the 
IRS and that lead to a great loss of tax revenue.  
 A. How the IRS Acquires Taxpayer Information  
On one hand, the IRS is entitled to any information that 
may be relevant to determining any tax liability,23 so it has 
tremendously broad legal authority to demand information. On 
the other hand, for a variety of reasons, especially the very low 
audit rate, relatively little information beyond the numbers on 
the face of the tax return is ever provided. The following 
describes the current system of providing individual tax 
information to the IRS. 
1. Information Provided by the Taxpayer  
To understand how information is provided to the IRS, it is 
important to understand the individual income tax return 
preparation and filing process. After the close of each year, any 
individual with gross annual income exceeding a certain 
amount must file an income tax return.24 About 145 million 
individual income tax returns are filed annually. 25  The 
taxpayer is responsible for learning the relevant law, gathering 
the relevant factual information, and applying the law to the 
facts as necessary to determine and report his or her liability 
for the year. This can be very complicated. For example, a 
taxpayer who pays for work on the roof of a business 
warehouse must navigate detailed treasury regulations to 
determine whether the expense should be deducted or 
capitalized.26 The return does not require disclosure of the legal 
                                                                                                             
IRS, and, as a tax on individuals, raises the most complex privacy issues. 
See The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-
Authority (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (stating that the IRS collected over 
$2.5 trillion and processed over 237 million returns in 2012). 
23  I.R.C. § 7602 (West 2014) (defining the examination of books and records); 
Id. § 7801 (defining the authority of Treasury Department); Id. § 7803 
(outlining the duties and authority of the IRS Commissioner). 
24  Id. § 6012 (defining persons required to make returns of income). An 
individual with gross income not exceeding the sum of the exemption and 
standard deduction need not file a return. Id. § 6012(a). For 2014, this 
threshold amount was $10,500 for a single individual. INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2013, at 7 ch. A, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
prior/i1040--2013.pdf.  
25  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS—INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 tbl.1.1, 2012, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-
Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns-Publication-1304-(Complete-Report) 
(last updated Aug. 22, 2014). [hereinafter, IRS, SOI Tax Stats]. This 
number includes returns filed by both single taxpayers and married 
taxpayers. 
26  This requires determining if the work should be characterized as a repair, 
betterment, restoration, or adaptation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4(a) (2014) 
(deeming the cost of repairs deductible in most cases); Treas. Reg.  
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analysis behind a taxpayer’s characterization (e.g., that the 
expense is deductible), nor does it require the taxpayer to 
supplement the return with the underlying supporting 
information (e.g., receipts).27 For the most part, the return only 
requires numbers the taxpayer has concluded to be the legally 
correct ones (e.g., the amount deductible). Once the return is 
filed, it is subject to an automated review which checks for 
mathematical errors and compares the information on the 
return with information the IRS has obtained elsewhere.28 Less 
than one percent of individual tax returns are ever audited.29  
In the rare case that a taxpayer is audited, the IRS may 
demand that the taxpayer provide more information than 
provided with the return. The taxpayer is obligated to maintain 
the records necessary to substantiate what he or she 
determined to be the tax liability,30 and the IRS is entitled to 
examine “any books, papers, records, or other data which may 
be relevant” to determining any tax liability.31 As part of its 
audit, the IRS may penalize the taxpayer for failing to 
                                                                                                             
§ 1.236(a)-3(d) (2013) (defining betterments, restorations, and adaptions of 
property as capitalized rather than deducted); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j), 
Ex. 13 (2014) (using the example of roof betterment); Treas. Reg. 
§1.263(a)-3(k), Ex. 14 (2014) (using the example of roof restoration). 
27  When assembling his or her Form 1040, a taxpayer is to submit only items 
specifically required. The Form 1040 does not require the taxpayer to 
submit his or her legal reasoning in support of any deductions, nor does it 
require submission of receipts associated with deducted expenses. See 
1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2013, supra note 26 at 72 (instructing taxpayers to 
submit only the materials required). 
28  See Caroline Rule, BNA Tax Management Portfolio 623-3rd: IRS 
Procedures: Examinations and Appeals, Section IB (2013) (describing the 
mostly automated review of all tax returns). 
29  In 2012, 99.1% of individual tax returns were not audited. While audit 
rates went up with income, a full 70% of returns reporting over ten 
million in income were not audited. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2012, tbl. 1 (Steven T. Miller et al. eds., 
2012). The IRS aims to audit only those returns it determines likely to 
have errors. See Rule, supra note 30, Section IIA (describing how returns 
are selected for further examination). 
30  With respect to this tax-relevant information, Congress has granted the 
Treasury broad authority to prescribe the taxpayer’s obligations to 
provide the information. I.R.C. § 6001 (West 2014). The Secretary is 
entitled to require any person to “make such returns, render such 
statements, or keep such records as the Secretary deems sufficient to 
show whether or not such person” has an income tax liability, and every 
person who does have an income tax liability must “keep such records, 
render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules 
and regulations as the Secretary” prescribes. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) 
(1990); see also MARTIN J. MCMAHON & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 39.01[8] (Thomson Reuters ed., 2013). 
31  I.R.C. § 7602 (West 2014) (defining the examination of books and records); 
Id. § 7801 (defining the authority of Treasury Department); Id. § 7803 
(outlining the duties and authority of the IRS Commissioner). 
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maintain the adequate records32 or for failing to have a suitably 
strong legal argument for the disputed characterization (e.g., 
the claim that an expense is deductible).33 If the taxpayer and 
IRS are unable to resolve their differences during the audit, the 
dispute may then be litigated in court. 
In preparing his or her return, the taxpayer bears the 
burden of interpreting the law, gathering the factual 
information, and applying the law to it. The relevance of 
information is laid out in multiple sources and in varying levels 
of detail. The Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, 
administrative rulings and publications, and court cases all 
determine what information is relevant under a given 
provision. 34  Determining the individual’s taxable income 
requires all information necessary to determine if a receipt or 
benefit is includible in or excludible from income, whether or 
not an expense is deductible from income, and which credits, if 
any, reduce the tentative tax liability. 35  Some of the 
information required for determining taxable income is simple, 
such as the amount of a taxpayer’s paycheck. 36  Other 
                                                 
32  See, e.g., id. § 7203 (deeming failure to keep required records to be a 
misdemeanor).  
33  For example, the taxpayer is subject to a penalty for a substantial 
understatement of income tax, I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) (West 2014), except to 
the extent that the underlying position had substantial authority or was 
disclosed with the return and had a reasonable basis, id.  
§ 6662(d)(2)(B).  
34  For example, I.R.C. § 213 provides specific definitions that must be 
satisfied for medical expenses to be deductible. The Treasury Regulations 
require submission of whatever information “the district director may 
deem necessary” to determine the deductibility of a medical expense. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(f) (1979) (outlining substantiation requirements, 
including “the nature of any other item of expense and for whom incurred 
and for what specific purpose, the amount paid therefor and the date of 
the payment thereof”). The relevant information is then discussed on four 
of the more than two hundred pages of instructions for the 1040. See  1040 
INSTRUCTIONS 2013, supra note 24, at 5, A-1, A-2, and A-3 (discussing 
medical expenses). Relevant information is also covered in more detail in 
a special thirty-five page publication. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
PUBLICATION 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES: FOR USE IN PREPARING 
2014 RETURNS (2014). For some specific expenses, additional 
administrative rulings have been issued regarding relevant information. 
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (establishing that weight loss 
program fees are not deductible even if recommended by a physician). 
Similarly, the courts have addressed what is relevant. See O’Donnabhain 
v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. No. 4 (2010) (holding that the treatment of “gender 
identity disorder” disease, hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery 
were deductible expenses, but that breast augmentation was merely 
cosmetic and not a deductible expense). 
35  See I.R.C. § 61 (West 2014) (defining gross income); id. § 63 (defining 
taxable income); id. §§ 51-53 (defining credits against tax); id. §§ 101-140 
(defining exclusions from income); id. §§ 161-210 (defining deductions 
against income). 
36  Id. § 61 (stating that gross income includes compensation for services). 
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information required is complex, such as the taxpayer’s reason 
for taking a trip 37  or making a gift. 38  Some information is 
strictly necessary, such as the purchase price of an asset.39 
Other information is necessary only for administrative safe 
harbors, such as those for excluding gain on the sale of a 
residence40  or characterizing an investment as active rather 
than passive.41  Some of the information is relatively public, 
such as one’s address. Other information is intensely private, 
such as information related to the medical care of oneself or 
one’s family members.42 
While a tremendous amount of information may be relevant 
and may be subject to review by the IRS in the event of an 
audit, audits are exceedingly rare. In almost all cases the only 
information that the taxpayer provides to the IRS is what is 
provided on the face of the return and as a supplement to it 
(such as the Form W2 from the taxpayer’s employer). More 
information is only provided if the IRS requests it. Thus, much 
of the relevant information never flows into the IRS. For 
example, though the information recording requirements for 
charitable contributions are fairly detailed, 43  none of those 
records are submitted with the return.44 The taxpayer claiming 
the charitable contribution deduction is obligated to maintain 
records and provide them to the IRS if requested.  
But it is not only the low audit rate that reduces the 
amount of tax-relevant information actually provided to the 
IRS for review. In order to lessen the burden on the taxpayer 
                                                 
37  Whether a trip is primarily for business or personal purposes determines 
the deductibility of travel expenses under I.R.C. § 162. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.162-2(a) (1960) (establishing that whether one undertakes trips for 
purposes other than business or solely for business purposes affects 
whether the expenses for said trip are tax deductible). 
38  To be excluded from income under I.R.C. § 102 (excluding gifts inter alia), 
the transferor’s motive must be one of detached and disinterested 
generosity. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). 
39  I.R.C. § 1012 (West 2014) (defining the cost basis of property). 
40 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3 (2004) (outlining safe harbors for reduced 
maximum exclusions for taxpayers who fail to meet certain requirements). 
41 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (1996) (setting the threshold for 
temporary material participation at more than five hundred hours spent 
on an activity in a year). 
42  See I.R.C. § 213 (West 2014); see also, e.g., id. § 213(d)(3) (listing 
prescribed drugs as deductible medical expenses); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-
04-111 (Oct. 31, 1979) (deeming weight loss program fees deductible 
where prescribed by physicians for alleviation of specific ailments); Rev. 
Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (stating that weight loss program fees are 
not deductible even though physician-recommended if not prescribed for 
alleviation of specific ailment); and Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307 
(stating that health club fees may be deductible if prescribed for 
alleviation of specific ailment). 
43  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (1996). 
44  2013 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 24, at A-9 . 
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and to simplify tax administration, Congress has reduced the 
amount of tax-relevant information for many taxpayers. 
Congress has done this through the standard deduction 
mechanism. More than two-thirds of individual taxpayers 
choose the single (and simple) standard deduction in lieu of 
multiple (and complex) itemized deductions.45 While there is a 
great deal of information relevant to claiming itemized 
deductions, much less information is required for those 
taxpayers electing the standard deduction. However, while the 
standard deduction reduces a taxpayer’s information burden, it 
does not eliminate it. 46  Information is still required to 
determine the taxpayer’s filing status, 47 qualifying 
dependents,48 inclusions49 and exclusions50 from the taxpayer’s 
income, available credits,51 and a fair number of deductions not 
precluded by the standard deduction, such as for business 
expenses, 52  alimony payments, 53  moving expenses, 54  and 
education expenses.55  
Arguably, a taxpayer who does not want to subject certain 
information to IRS review could simply forego the related 
deduction or credit. For example, a taxpayer who does not want 
the IRS to have the right to review the details of his or her 
charitable support simply might choose not to claim the 
                                                 
45  For the most recent year reported, 2012, sixty-seven percent of individual 
income tax returns reported the standard rather than itemized 
deductions. IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 25, tbl 1.2   
46 When taking the standard deduction, the taxpayer is precluded from 
taking itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 63(b) (West 2014) (defining taxable 
income for individuals who do not itemize deductions); see also MCMAHON 
AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 21.04. Itemized deductions are all 
deductions, other than the above-the-line deduction in I.R.C. § 62(a) and 
the personal exemption deduction in I.R.C. § 151. See I.R.C. § 63(d) (West 
2014). 
47  See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2014) (setting forth different tax tables based on the 
taxpayer’s filing status). 
48  See Id. § 152 (defining qualifying child or relative). 
49  Id. §§ 71, 74, 83 (describing alimony and separate maintenance, prizes 
and awards, and property transferred in connection with performance of 
services, respectively). 
50  Id. §§ 102, 121, 132 (describing gifts and inheritances, exclusion of gain 
from sale of principal residence, and certain fringe benefits, respectively). 
51  Id. §§ 32, 36 (describing earned income and first-time home buyer credt). 
52  Id. § 62(a)(1) (defining trade and business deductions to be used in 
computing adjusted gross income). 
53  Id. § 62(a)(10) (listing deduction for alimony as provided in I.R.C. § 215 in 
computed adjusted gross income). 
54  Id. § 62(a)(15) (listing moving expense deduction in computing adjusted 
gross income as provided in I.R.C. § 217). 
55  Id. § 62(a)(17)-(18) (listing educational loan interest deduction as provided 
in I.R.C. §§ 221 and educational expense deductions as provided in I.R.C. 
§ 222 in computing adjusted gross income). 
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charitable contribution deduction. 56  However, this is not as 
simple as it may seem at first. Some lawyers argue that no part 
of the statutory formula for determining tax liability is 
optional. They emphasize that the formula is arithmetic: 
exclusions are excluded, inclusions are included, deductions are 
deducted, and credits are credited.57 But, theories aside, in fact, 
taxpayers often forego deductions for which they qualify. 
Sometimes they do so for strategic reasons, such as limiting 
their (perceived) audit risk or reserving some deductions to 
claim in settlement negotiations of multiple issues if the return 
is audited.58 Sometimes they do so in an effort to keep certain 
information from being subject to IRS review.59 Perhaps most 
of all, however, they do so out of ignorance of the deductions 
available to them. 
Another complication in IRS information collection is that 
otherwise relevant information available for IRS review may 
become irrelevant as a result of computational mechanics.  
For example, in the case of the “miscellaneous itemized 
deductions,” none of the deductions can be taken unless all of 
the deductions together exceed a percentage of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income. 60  Similarly, taxpayers with income 
exceeding certain amounts may not be entitled to claim certain 
deductions or credits, such as the deduction on qualified 
education loans61 or the Hope Scholarship Credit.62 Taxpayers 
who otherwise would qualify for deductions or credits will have 
the relevant information become irrelevant if they fail to 
qualify due to excessive income. Some deductions are available 
for only substantial expenditures, such as the medical expense 
                                                 
56  See James Edward Maule, No Thanks Uncle Sam, You Can Keep Your 
Tax Break, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 81, 91 (2006). 
57  Id. at 83-84 (characterizing the debate over the obligatory nature of 
deductions as one of the deepest, most intense, and longest-lasting on the 
e-mail list-serve of the American Bar Association Section on Taxation). 
58 Id. at 89-92. 
59  See, e.g., id. at 141 (citing Beatty v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 438 
(1980), in which the “taxpayer stated ‘that if verification was required of 
him then he was willing to forego the deduction as the price for preventing 
the government from interfering in his private affairs.’”) 
60  These are the miscellaneous itemized deductions, which I.R.C. § 67 
provides may not be taken except to the extent that their sum total 
exceeds two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Examples of 
miscellaneous itemized deductions include I.R.C. §§ 163 (Interest), 164 
(Taxes), 165 (covering casualty and theft losses), 170 (Charitable, etc., 
contributions and gifts), and 213 (Medical, dental, etc., expenses). 
61  I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(B) (West 2014) (reducing the deduction amount for 
taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $65,000 and eliminating it 
entirely for adjusted gross incomes above $80,000). 
62  Id. § 25A(d)(2)(A) (reducing the amount of the Hope Scholarship Credit to 
“the excess of the taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income for such 
taxable year over $40,000 for tax years prior to 2014 and $80,000 for 
taxable years beginning in 2014, bears to $10,000”). 
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deduction, which requires medical expenses to exceed ten 
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.63 This means 
that the medical records used to substantiate potential 
deductions will become irrelevant if the total expenses do not 
exceed the specified amount. Thus, the computational 
mechanics of certain deductions and credits disqualify many 
taxpayers who otherwise would qualify, and, as a result, the 
amount of tax-relevant information for those taxpayers is 
reduced. 
2.  Information Provided by Third Parties 
While the taxpayer is obligated to maintain records and 
provide tax-relevant information to the IRS, either on the 
initial tax return or later by specific request, 64 the IRS is not 
limited to obtaining information from the taxpayer. Indeed, 
information about ninety-seven percent of taxpayers is 
provided to the IRS in routine reports from third parties.65 For 
example, a taxpayer’s employer is required to report payroll 
information to the IRS.66 A corporation that pays a dividend to 
the taxpayer must report it to the IRS,67 as do interest and 
royalty payors.68 Whenever a real estate sale closes, the closing 
agent must report the seller’s identity, the property, and the 
sale price.69 And any business receiving more than $10,000 (in 
cash or checks) must report the identity, address, and the 
Social Security Number of the payor to the IRS. 70  About 
                                                 
63  Id. § 213(a) (explaining that medical expenses not otherwise covered by 
insurance are deductible to extent the expenses exceed ten percent of 
adjusted gross income). 
64  See  supra note 30. 
65 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 181. For example, a taxpayer’s employer is 
required to provide payroll information to the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6051 (West 
2014) (Receipts for employees). Similarly, payments of dividends, I.R.C. 
§ 6042, interest, I.R.C. § 6049, and royalties, I.R.C. § 6050N, to a taxpayer 
obligate the payor to provide information about the payment to the IRS. 
Real estate closings usually obligate the closing attorney or the title 
company to provide the IRS information about the seller, the property, 
and the sales price. Id. § 6045(e) (West 2014). Those receiving more than 
$10,000 in the course of business must report to the IRS the name, 
address, and the Social Security Number of the payor. Id. § 6050I; see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-1 (2001).  
66  I.R.C. § 6051 (West 2014) (Receipts for employees).  
67  Id. § 6042. 
68  Id. §§ 6049, 6050N. 
69  Id. § 6045(e).  
70  Id. § 6050I; Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-1(e)(2) (2001). In 2010, Congress vastly 
expanded third party reporting by requiring business taxpayers to file 
reports on each person from whom the business purchased more than 
$600 in goods in a year. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care  
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9006(b)(1) (amending 
 I.R.C. § 6041(a) to require reports on amounts paid by businesses “in 
consideration for property.”). However, this far-reaching requirement was 
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seventy-five items are reported by third parties to the IRS 
whether or not the taxpayer is audited. These items are 
reported as a matter of routine, not request.71 
But in gathering information about the taxpayer, the IRS  
is not limited to routine reports. It has broad legal authority  
to summon information from third parties, including business 
contacts, employees, and advisors.72 Even though the attorney-
client privilege and a similar privilege for accountants 73  
are available to protect those advisors from being compelled  
to testify in certain situations, no protection exists if  
the information has been provided in connection with the 
preparation of a return.74 Generally, there is neither Fourth 
Amendment protection for information held by third parties 
(including the taxpayer’s lawyers or accountants),75 nor is there 
Fifth Amendment protection.76 With respect to the information 
                                                                                                             
quickly repealed the following year. See Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer 
Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, 125 Stat. 36 (repealing the addition to § 6041(a)). 
71  Form 1040 Instructions summarize how to incorporate third-party 
provided information into the Form 1040. This information has been 
provided to both the taxpayer and the IRS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1040 
INSTRUCTIONS 2014, at 10-11, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf.  
72  Generally, a summons to third parties may be issued only after the 
taxpayer has been given notice that contacts with third parties may be 
made. I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West 2014); see also id. § 7604; MCMAHON AND 
ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 47.02[1].  
73  I.R.C. § 7525(a) (West 2014). 
74  See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that communications related to preparation of client’s tax returns are not 
privileged); see also United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that taxpayer’s nonbusiness records that taxpayer’s accountant 
had delivered to attorney were not privileged); United States v. Brown, 
349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), modified, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973) 
(explaining that an accounting firm’s documents generally may be 
compelled because they do not fall under the work product doctrine, there 
is no federal accountant-client privilege, and an accountant’s notes do not 
become privileged merely because they are based on statements made in 
the presence of an attorney); MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 
47.02[2][b]. 
75  Where a document is in the hands of a third party, there is no expectation 
of privacy for the taxpayer, even if the taxpayer maintains ownership of 
the record. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1973) 
(finding that client had no legitimate expectation of privacy for tax records 
held by his accountant). 
76  There is no Fifth Amendment protection for records held by accountants 
or lawyers. Id. (finding that an accountant holding the taxpayer’s records 
was compelled to provide them because the taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination adhered only to the taxpayer, not the 
accountant); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compelling a  
lawyer holding a taxpayer’s record to disclose it). 
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held by the taxpayer and no one else, Fifth Amendment 
protection against compulsion is available—but limited.77 
B. The Tax Information Gap  
The current system of providing individual income  
tax-relevant information to the IRS has two substantial 
problems. The first is that the burden on individual taxpayers 
complying with the system is significant. The second is that  
a great many taxpayers do not comply with the system, causing 
a tremendous loss of tax revenue. Both of these problems  
are ameliorated to the extent that third parties provide 
information to the taxpayer (which tends to ease compliance) 
and the IRS (which tends to ensure compliance). Both of these 
problems reflect the information gap between the taxpayer and 
the IRS. 
1. Compliance Burden 
The tax compliance burden is the cost to taxpayers of 
attempting to report their tax liabilities in a timely manner. 
This requires knowing what information is tax relevant, 
organizing it, and being sufficiently informed as to the tax law 
and how to make the computations. The IRS estimates that an 
individual filing the Form 1040, the most commonly filed 
individual income tax return, will spend sixteen hours doing 
so. 78  The record keeping requirements are the largest 
component of that: eight hours. 79  The National Taxpayer 
Advocate has concluded that individual “taxpayers find the 
return preparation process so overwhelming that more than 80 
                                                 
77  The Fifth Amendment is not a defense for failing to file an income tax 
return (e.g., when engaged in an illegal business), though the taxpayer 
may claim the privilege as to “the specific questions for which a valid 
privilege exists” so long as the taxpayer completes “the remainder of the 
form.” 3 WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 19:93. See generally Garner v. U.S., 424 
U.S. 648 (1976) (holding that incriminating disclosures of gambling were 
admissible evidence and not compelled incrimination where they had been 
made on petitioner’s tax return). Tax-relevant records that have been 
voluntarily prepared by the taxpayer have not been compelled and thus do 
not qualify for Fifth Amendment protection. U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 
(1984). Arguably, at least some tax-relevant records may be required and 
thus may not be protected by the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., M.H. v. 
United States, 648 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that records related 
to the foreign bank accounts of a taxpayer fell within the scope of the 
required records doctrine). Nevertheless, the acts of “gathering, 
identifying, and authenticating” the tax relevant records may be 
testimonial and therefore privileged. See JOHN A. TOWNSEND, LARRY A. 
CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON & SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES 238 
(2008). 
78 This number does not include post-filing time, such as time spent 
responding to IRS requests for additional information. Estimates of 
Taxpayer Burden, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2014, supra note 71, at 97-98. 
79  Id. 
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percent pay transaction fees to help them file their returns.”80 
Tax compliance requires 7.6 billion work-hours a year.81 If it 
were an industry, it would employ 3.8 million employees full-
time.82 
The compliance burden is so high because the individual is 
obligated to navigate a complex, regularly changing set of laws 
that determines what information is relevant and how it affects 
the taxpayer’s liability. The individual taxpayer’s gap of 
knowledge about the tax law, tax-relevant facts, and how to 
apply the law to the facts is quite understandable. The tax code 
has over 3.5 million words, about three times as many as it did 
in 1975.83 In hard copy form, the regulations and summaries  
of administrative guidance and relevant case law take  
nine feet of shelf space. 84  And the statutory provisions 
themselves are technical and overlapping. By the National  
Taxpayer Advocate’s count, a taxpayer interested in correctly 
characterizing college education expenses must navigate eleven 
different provisions, each of which has its own eligibility 
requirements, definitions, income thresholds, phase-outs, and 
inflation adjustments. 85 A similar count of provisions relevant 
to characterizing retirement savings comes to sixteen different 
provisions, each with different rules. 86  And both of these 
categories provide benefits to the taxpayer. “It is not 
reasonable to expect the average taxpayer to learn the details 
of at least 27 education and retirement incentives to determine 
which ones provide the best fit.”87 The burden on the taxpayer 
is so great that, while sophisticated taxpayers are able to find 
“loopholes,” unsophisticated taxpayers often overpay. 88  To 
illustrate the last point, the National Taxpayer Advocate 
pointed out that in 2006, thirty-seven million taxpayers failed 
to claim a credit for which they were qualified.89  
While the complexity of the tax law imposes a tremendous 
burden on taxpayers, the law’s requirement that third parties 
provide information to taxpayers significantly reduces that 
burden. As mentioned above, employers and others are 
required to report information to both the IRS and the 
taxpayer, and about ninety-seven percent of taxpayers have 
                                                 
80  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2008 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/National-
Taxpayer-Advocate's-2008-Annual-Report-to-Congress. 
81  Id. at 3. 
82  Id.  
83  Id. at 4. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 5. 
86  Id. at 6. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 11. 
89  Id. 
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information provided to them this way.90 When third parties 
are obligated to provide information, they must do so in a 
particular format. The format requires the third party to know 
and apply the relevant law so that it provides not only dollar 
amounts to the taxpayer but characterizes the amount for the 
taxpayer. The most common example is the Form W-2, the tax 
statement issued by employers to employees. Box 1 of that form 
provides not just a dollar amount, but also a characterization of 
the amount as “wages, tips, [or] other compensation.”91 This 
puts the burden on the third party to characterize the amount. 
The Form W-2 instructions to the third party are over thirty 
pages.92 To reduce the taxpayer’s burden even further, the IRS 
uses line 7 of the Form 1040 to direct the taxpayer to report the 
amount from the W-2 box 1. 93  Similarly, box 4 of the W-2 
informs the taxpayer how much federal income tax was 
withheld, 94 while the IRS uses line 62 of the Form 1040 to 
direct the taxpayer to insert the right amounts.95 Box 10 of the 
W-2 characterizes for the taxpayer amounts paid for qualified 
dependent benefits, which is to be reported by the taxpayer on 
Form 2441, Part III. Box 12 of the W2 is the characterization 
for adoption benefits. This is to be reported by the taxpayer on 
Form 8839, line 20. Other important reports of information to 
the taxpayer include the Form 1098, which instructs the 
taxpayer how much qualified mortgage interest he or she paid 
in the year,96 an amount that is deductible on line 10 of the 
Form 1040 Schedule A.97 The Form 1098-E covers student loan 
interest reportable on line 33 of the Form 1040. Box 1b of the 
Form 1099-DIV characterizes payments as qualified dividends, 
which qualify for a special tax rate and are reported on 9b of 
the Form 1040. Indeed, there are over seventy-five items of 
information provided to the taxpayer by third parties that the 
Form 1040 instructions correlate with a particular line number 
for the taxpayer. 98  Without the pre-characterization of this 
information by third parties and the instructional correlation of 
forms by the IRS, taxpayers using the Form 1040 would spend 
far more than eight hours maintaining their tax records and 
                                                 
90  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 181, http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-
Annual-Report/FY-2012-Annual-Report-To-Congress-Full-Report.html. 
91  W2 WAGE AND TAX STATEMENT 2 (2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/ 
fw2.pdf. 
92  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2015 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS W2 AND 
W3, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw2w3.pdf.  
93  1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2014, supra note 71, at 10-11. 
94  Id. 
95  Id.  
96  Id.  
97  Id.  
98  Id. 
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eight hours completing the return.99This third-party reporting 
greatly reduces the compliance burden. 
2. The Tax Compliance Gap Is Substantial  
The tax compliance gap—the difference between the income 
tax liability legally owed and the amount timely paid— 
is about $450 billion each year.100 To put that into context, 
consider that the Department of Defense budget is about  
$673 billion.101 The tax compliance gap is almost four times  
the size of the Department of the Treasury budget (which 
includes the IRS). 102  And, it is larger than the combined 
budgets of the Small Business Administration, 103  the  
National Science Foundation,104 the Department of Homeland 
Security,105 the Department of the Interior,106 the Department 
of State and Other International Programs, 107  the  
Department of Education,108 the Department of Housing and  
Urban Development, 109  the National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration, 110  the Department of Energy, 111  the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 112  the Department of 
Commerce,113 the Department of Justice,114and the Department 
of Labor.115 
                                                 
99  Estimates of Taxpayer Burden, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2014, supra note 71, at 
97-98.  
100 Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; 
Compliance Remains Statistically Unchanged From Previous Study (Feb. 
6, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-New-Tax-Gap-Estimates;-
Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-Unchanged-From-Previous-Study. 
Some argue the tax gap is higher. See, e.g., Eric Toder, What is the Tax 
Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007) (criticizing tax gap measurement 
methodology). 
101  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 84 (2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/ 
budget.pdf  
102  Id. at 167. 
103  Id. at 194 (about $1.4 billion). 
104  Id. at 190 (about $7.5 billion). 
105  Id. at 121 (about $55 billion). 
106  Id. at 135 (about $13 billion). 
107  Id. at 156 (about $60 billion). 
108  Id. at 128 (about $35 billion).  
109  Id. at 141 (about $41 billion). 
110  Id. at 185 (about $18 billion). 
111  Id. at 105 (about $35 billion). 
112  Id. at 181 (about $9 billion). 
113  Id. at 76 (about $9 billion). 
114  Id. at 141 (about $37 billion). 
115  Id. at 149 (about $102 billion). 
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 The compliance gap is attributable to non-filing, 
underreporting, and underpayment. 116  Non-filing is the 
smallest of the three sources of the gap, responsible for about 
$28 billion.117 It occurs when taxpayers who should file a return 
do not do so on time.118 Underpayment is the second smallest 
source of the gap, at $46 billion.119 This is when taxpayers file 
the return but do not pay what is due by the due date.120 
Underreporting is the greatest source of the gap—$376 
billion).121 This occurs when taxpayers understate income or 
overstate exemptions, deductions, or credits.122  
It is clear that third-party reporting to the IRS is directly 
related to the taxpayers’ self-reporting the item. Third-party 
reported information is “pivotal in causing taxpayers to be 
forthright in their reporting” to the IRS.123 When a third party 
has an obligation to report payments made to the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer’s compliance rate for the item is ninety-six to ninety-
nine percent.124 For income items with no third party reporting 
obligation, the taxpayer compliance rate is less than fifty 
percent. 125  In other words, when a taxpayer’s employer 
provides Form W2 wage and benefit information both to the 
taxpayer and the IRS, or when a corporation provides Form 
1099-DIV dividend information both to the taxpayer and the 
IRS, the taxpayer is almost certain to report it. However, when 
a taxpayer receives a payment that is not reported by a third 
party such as the receipt of cash for services or purchases, the 
taxpayer is unlikely to report it. When the IRS does not rely 
only on the taxpayer’s compliance efforts in order to collect 
information, it collects both more information and more tax 
revenue. Third party information reporting not only reduces 
the compliance burden but also the compliance gap. 
                                                 
116 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Gap “Map”: Tax Year 2006 (2011), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf.  
117 Id. 
118  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Understanding the Tax Gap (July 16, 2014) 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-the-Tax-Gap. 
119  Tax Gap “Map”: Tax Year 2006, supra note 116. 
120  Understanding the Tax Gap, supra note 118. 
121 Tax Gap “Map”: Tax Year 2006, supra note 116. 
122  Understanding the Tax Gap, supra note 118. 
123  Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371, 371 
(2007). 
124  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 285-86, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/National-Tax 
payer-Advocate's-2011-Annual-Report-to-Congress; Schulman, supra note 
1. 
125 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 124, at 285-86 
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II. Surveillance to Close the Information Gap 
In this Part, I predict that over the next twenty-five years, 
the IRS will increasingly rely on surveillance technologies to 
reduce the compliance burden and compliance gap. Both the 
compliance burden and gap have received attention from the 
U.S. Senate Finance Committee, the IRS Commissioner, the 
National Taxpayer Advocate, tax scholars, and politicians. 
Their call to harness new technologies to solve these problems 
must now be considered in the context of the information 
technology revolution. Whether surveillance technologies are 
used to eliminate the compliance burden and the compliance 
gap ultimately will be a matter of political will, specifically 
including the will to reform the tax system to fit the 
technologies. 
A. The Information Gap Problem 
As outlined in Part I, the tax information gap causes two 
problems: the compliance burden and the compliance gap. The 
compliance burden is the difficulty taxpayers suffer due to 
inadequate information about how to comply with and 
maintain the records for complying with the tax law. The 
compliance gap is how much federal tax revenue is lost through 
noncompliance. The tax compliance burden amounts to 7.6 
billion hours a year of taxpayer time,126 and the tax compliance 
gap costs the federal revenue $450 billion a year.127  
Both the compliance burden and compliance gap have 
received considerable political attention. As Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee in 2015, Senator Orin Hatch 
described the costs of compliance as equal to the economy of 
New Zealand.128 Senator Ron Wyden described the compliance 
process as “painful.”129 In 2011, the Senate Finance Committee 
held hearings on the tax gap, during which Senator Hatch 
                                                 
126 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 80, at 3. 
127  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
128 Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of 
Simplification in Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
114th Cong. (2014) (statement of Sen. Hatch), http://www.finance.senate 
.gov/imo/media/doc/3.10.2015%20RELEASE%20Hatch%20Statement%20a
t%20Finance%20Hearing%20on%20Simplifying%20the%20Tax%20Code1 
.pdf (describing the costs of tax compliance as larger than the economy of 
New Zealand).  
129 Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of 
Simplification in Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 
114th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement of Sen. Wyden), http://www.finance.sen 
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/031015%20Wyden%20Says%20Comprehensive%20
Reform%20Needed%20to%20Simplify%20Tax%20Code%20for%20Middle
%20Class%20Americans.pdf (describing the tax returning filing process as 
painful).  
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testified that the “[t]ax gap is the great white whale of deficit 
reduction. If only the government was able to collect what it is 
owed, our deficits would be reduced significantly.”130 Senator 
Max Baucus identified increased information reporting as one 
of the most promising solutions to closing the tax gap, but 
worried that increasing information reporting would 
inappropriately increase the burden on the information-
reporting third parties.131 He hoped there would be “ways the 
IRS can harness new technology.”132 
IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman articulated a specific 
vision of how new technology could harness more information 
and improve tax administration. Commissioner Schulman 
described the IRS as “an information intensive enterprise,” 
saying that what “really matters” to the IRS is “the 
organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and 
intelligence we extract from the information.”133 In this context, 
he articulated his “long-term vision” that “the IRS could get all 
information from third parties before individual taxpayers filed 
their returns. Taxpayers or their return preparers could then 
access that information, via the Web, to prepare their tax 
returns.”134 Echoing the Commissioner and tax scholars,135 the 
National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olsen has called for third 
parties to electronically report information to taxpayers to  
aid them in preparing their returns.136 However, she went one 
step further in her recommendations by suggesting that the 
IRS use third-party reported information to prepare returns  
for taxpayers.137  On this point, she echoed President Barak 
Obama’s campaign call to provide “taxpayers the option of pre-
filled tax forms to verify, sign and return.” 138  
                                                 
130  Id. 
131  Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easier and 
Collecting What’s Due: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Baucus).  
132  Id. at 2.  
133  Schulman, supra note 1.  
134 Id.  
135  See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, Call for the Gradual Phase-Out of All Paper Tax 
Information Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345 (2010) (calling for third 
parties to provide tax data at a secure IRS website taxpayers could use to 
prepare their tax returns, creating administrative efficiencies and 
simplifying the return preparation process). 
136  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 343, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/National-Taxpayer 
-Advocate's-2009-Annual-Report-to-Congress. 
137 Id. at 344. 
138 Barack Obama’s Comprehensive Tax Plan, 3, available at http://halebobb 
.com/Obama/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf.  
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B. Information Technology Revolution and the 
Information Gap  
These proposals for using technology to leverage tax 
information for taxpayers have to be considered in light of the 
revolution in information technology. If the IRS could collect 
and analyze all tax-relevant information, it could lower both 
the compliance gap and compliance burden. Presumably the 
coming ubiquity of smart devices and the ability to process the 
massive quantities of data generated by those devices139 could 
enable the IRS to do so. How might the “minutely detailed 
records of our lives” created by these technologies be used in 
tax compliance? 140  Imagine that every day “rivulets of 
information stream into electronic brains” at the IRS “to be 
sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined in hundreds of 
different ways” to determine tax consequences.141 While the use 
of this information for tax compliance purposes might be novel, 
those rivulets of information already exist and are expanding. 
These streams of information already flow from and through 
government agencies and private companies. Government 
agencies, “industry, employers, hospitals, transportation 
providers, Silicon Valley, and individuals” are all “linked, 
shared, and integrated.”142  They use the “same technologies 
and techniques” to gather information so that the “digital 
fruits” can be shared between them. 143  And over the next 
twenty years, those shared rivulets of information will swell 
with the “growing gush of data” from the “internet of things.”144 
Other government agencies, such as the NSA have taken 
the lead in pursuing this growing gush of data, but the IRS 
may follow their lead. Reportedly, the NSA’s goal is 
intercepting, sorting, and analyzing much of the world’s 
internet activities.145 The quantity of information processed by 
the NSA is tremendous—it is estimated that every fourteen 
seconds, the NSA processes information equal to all of the 
information in the Library of Congress.146 But the NSA is not 
alone. The government works with private companies in a 
                                                 
139  Big Data is shorthand for the technology that can process vast quantities 
of data in very short times, mining the data for patterns—especially 
patterns useful for predictions. It can be used to analyze physical, 
transactional, and behavioral data about people. Julie E. Cohen, What 
Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920, 1931 (2013). 
140  Richards, supra note 4, at 1934. 
141  Solove, supra note 17, at 1394. 
142  Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance, supra note 5, at 262. 
143  Richards, supra note 4, at 1958. 
144  Clarke, supra note 18. 
145 Richards, supra note 4, at 1934. 
146 Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 393, 401 (2014). 
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public-private partnership designed to provide “contemporary 
and perpetual access to details about everywhere we go and 
everything we do, say, or write.”147 Over the next twenty-five 
years, as we move towards 2040, the year by which these 
details may be known to the agencies and companies, 
presumably the IRS will be among those entities pursuing this 
growing gush of data. This prospect gives privacy law and tax 
law scholars a good deal to discuss.148  
C. Predicting a Tax Surveillance System  
I predict that over the next twenty-five years surveillance 
technologies will be used to reduce the compliance burden and 
compliance gap, at least to some extent. The growing gush of 
data is too valuable to ignore when contemplating how to solve 
the compliance burden and gap. But technological and political 
factors will either pave or block the way for increasing 
surveillance to improve tax administration. Ultimately, it is the 
political factors that will determine the extent to which the IRS 
is enabled to capture the growing “rivulets of information” 
streaming “into electronic brains.”149  
1. The IRS and the Growing Gush of Data  
Consider how the IRS might use the growing gush of data. 
In a world where government agencies and private companies 
achieve “perpetual access to details about everywhere we go 
and everything we do, say, or write,”150 we can imagine those 
details flowing through electronic brains at the IRS for tax 
analysis. With information about a taxpayer’s location each day 
and night, travel, and purchase patterns and those of her 
family members, colleagues, and customers, the IRS might 
determine the likelihood that a particular residence is the 
taxpayer’s principal residence,151 that she regularly conducts 
business activities within it,152 that some of those with whom 
                                                 
147  Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 4, at 64. 
148  Clarke, supra note 18.  
149  Solove, supra note 17, at 1394. 
150  Id. 
151  For example, the number of days the taxpayer lived in his or her home 
and the proximity of the home to the taxpayer’s place of employment, 
religious congregation, social clubs etc., may be necessary to determine 
the tax consequences on the home’s sale. I.R.C. § 121 (West 2014) 
(excluding gain from sale of principal residence); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-
1(b)(2) (2002) (determining which property is taxpayer’s principal 
residence). 
151  Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(e)(2) (2004) (describing sale by reason of unforeseen 
circumstances—specific event safe harbors). 
152  The nature of any business activities regularly conducted in a taxpayer’s 
home (and the square footage of the home in which such activities occur, 
such as meeting with clients) determines if any part of the home  
expenses are deductible as a home office. I.R.C. § 280A(a), (c) (West 2014) 
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she shares the residence are dependents153 or that one is a 
former spouse from whom she is legally separated,154 or that 
certain meal expenses155 are for business rather than personal 
purposes.156 By comparing a taxpayer’s business expenses with 
those of taxpayers in the same line of business, the IRS might 
determine the likelihood that an expense was “ordinary” and 
“necessary”, and therefore, deductible.157 By analyzing what a 
taxpayer reads (where and for how long a taxpayer’s gaze falls 
on certain screens),158 the entertainment a taxpayer pursues, 
and where and how much time a taxpayer spends in relevant 
places, the IRS might determine the likelihood that certain 
                                                                                                             
(disallowing deductions for business use of homes subject to exceptions); 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(a)  (deductibility of expenses attributable to 
business use of home). 
153  Determining if a child is a dependent may be especially important when 
the child’s parents are divorced. See I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (West 2014) 
(defining a qualifying child as having the same principal place of abode as 
taxpayer for more than one-half of year); Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971) 
(providing general definition of a dependent and listing special 
circumstances of absences of less than six months). 
154  Payments to a separated spouse with whom one is actually living is 
relevant to determining the tax consequences of the payment. See I.R.C. 
§ 71(b)(1) (West 2014) (defining alimony and separate maintenance 
payments). 
155  If you incurred and paid for meal expenses at the same time, while in  
the same restaurant as those who paid your professional fees in the recent 
past (or do in the near future), it seems likely the meal was for business 
purposes, especially if there were not additional entertainment expenses 
in the same evening. See I.R.C. § 274(a) (West 2014) (disallowing certain 
entertainment expenses); id. § 274(e) (listing exceptions, such as for 
meetings of employees or shareholders). 
156  Information revealing that you travelled to a distant city, paid fees for a 
conference where others in your profession also paid fees, stayed in a hotel 
in which other professional stayed the same number of nights, and did not 
incur expenses at nearby theme parks, day spas, or night clubs, indicates 
that it is likely the travel was primarily for business purposes and thus 
deductible. See id. § 162(a)(2) (describing deductible travel expenses for 
trade or business); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1960) (determining whether a 
trip is primarily business or personal). 
157  For example, a business expense must be “ordinary and necessary,” based 
on the normal expenses of those in the taxpayer’s line of business. For 
compensation paid to be deductible, it must be “reasonable,” which is also 
based on the taxpayer’s line of business. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2014) 
(stating reasonable compensation that is ordinary and necessary is 
deductible); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (clarifying that “reasonably” 
generally means as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like 
enterprises under like circumstances); see also Welch v. Helvering, 290 
U.S. 111 (1933) (holding that business expenses must be customary or 
expected in line of business). 
158  The Kindle and Nook already track reader behavior, down to the specific 
pages on which a reader lingers. Richards, supra note 4, at 1939. 
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expenses (e.g., for raising horses) were non-deductible hobby 
expenses rather than deductible business expenses.159  
Over the next twenty-five years, it is likely that there will 
be efforts to meet the need for more tax-relevant information 
with technologies that can gather it efficiently and analyze it 
reliably. The result could be technologically pre-filled returns 
ready for the taxpayer to verify, sign and submit. While there 
are about 145 million individual tax returns filed each year, 
potentially tax-relevant information would need to be gathered 
on anyone who may have income in order to determine if the 
income meets the threshold for filing. As the tax system has 
increasingly become used for purposes other than revenue-
collection—such as delivering welfare payments through the 
Earned Income Tax Credit or health care coverage though the 
Affordable Care Act160—information on many individuals who 
have no income would need to be gathered as well. This 
routine, systematic collection of data on such a large 
population—this surveillance 161  of the population—could 
eliminate all compliance burdens on individuals, as well all 
routes of evasion.  
                                                 
159  The line between deductible business expenses and non-deductible 
personal expenses is particularly difficult to discern when the taxpayer 
has a hobby that generates income, even though the taxpayer is pursuing 
the hobby for pleasure rather than profit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1 (1960) 
(stating relevant factors for determining if activity is engaged in for profit 
include taxpayer’s expertise, time devoted to activity, manner of carrying 
it out, success in other activities, and elements of personal pleasure or 
recreation). 
160  The Earned Income Tax Credit program is the second largest cash or 
near-cash assistance program for low-income Americans. It is a 
refundable credit, meaning it not only reduces a recipient’s income tax 
liability but results in a cash payment to the extent the credit exceeds  
the liability. More than 26 million American households received benefits  
in 2015, totaling $60 billion. Tax Policy Center, Taxation and  
the Family: What is the Earned Income Tax Credit? in THE TAX  
POLICY BRIEFING BOOK, available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm (last visited August 11, 2015). 
The Affordable Care Act is primarily administered by the IRS. The tax 
return is used to report health insurance coverage to the IRS.  The IRS 
also receives the shared responsibility payments. Internal Revenue Serv., 
Individual Shared Responsibility Provision, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-
Care-Act/Individuals-and-Families/Individual-Shared-Responsibility-
Provision (last updated July 20, 2015). 
161  In defining surveillance, Neil Richards considers four markers:  
First, it is focused on learning information about 
individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic; it  
is intentional rather than random or arbitrary.  
Third, surveillance is routine—a part of the ordinary 
administrative apparatus that characterizes modern 
societies. Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety 
of purposes—rarely totalitarian domination, but more 
typically subtler forms of influence or control. 
Richards, supra note 4, at 1937. 
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2. Technological Feasibility  
This prediction naturally requires an inquiry into what the 
relevant surveillance technology would require and whether 
such a “Tax Surveillance System” could become technologically 
feasible over the next twenty-five years. It seems most likely 
that “barring some civilization-threatening disaster, the next 
25 years of cyberspace will see a growing gush of data” that will 
be collected and analyzed by “an increasingly rapid spreading 
of interconnected devices into every aspect of our lives, in our 
cars, throughout our homes, and, indeed, into our bodies.”162 
This internet-of-things is predicted to include fifty billion 
objects by 2020.163 By 2040 it “could be a given” that all of  
our activities are known by governmental and corporate 
entities.” 164  Of course, accurately predicting the specifics of 
future technological developments is notoriously difficult. 165 
Only time will tell. But in the meantime private companies are 
betting that “Big Data” and the internet-of-things and other 
technological advancements will be transformative.  
Yet, while these may be tremendously useful for companies 
seeking profit, it may be that the tax system’s need for these 
advancements would be significantly different. It may turn out 
that much of what private companies are best at doing would 
not easily transfer to tax surveillance. Private companies aim 
to monitor, predict, and change consumer behavior. Their 
analysis does not require legal-standard accuracy. For 
example, a retailer’s attempt to determine who is especially 
vulnerable to specific marketing efforts may only be accurate 
two-thirds of the time, yet be exceptionally profitable and 
impose no harm on the remaining one-third of subjects 
targeted. However, the Tax Surveillance System would need to 
analyze tax consequences within legal standards of accuracy. 
Errors might violate taxpayers’ legal rights, result in economic 
                                                 
162  Clarke, supra note 18; see also generally Nick Bilton, Intruders for the 
Plugged-In Home, Coming in Through the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2014, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/dark-side-to-internet-of-
things-hacked-homes-and-invasive-ads; Nick Bilton, Some Predictions 
About the Internet of Things and Wearable Tech from  
Pew Research, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2014/05/14/some-predictions-about-the-next-decade-from-pew-research;  
Don Clark, ‘Internet of Things’ in Reach, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023036406045792965808929
73264.  
163  Clark, supra note 18.  
164  Id.  
165 For analysis of the general overconfidence of experts with respect to 
artificial intelligence, especially with respect to timeline predictions, see 
generally Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala & Seán S.Ó hÉigeartaigh, The 
Errors, Insights and Lessons of Famous AI Predictions—And What They 
Mean for the Future, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 317 (2014). 
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drag (over-taxing) or windfall (under-taxing), and even increase 
tax administration and compliance costs. The profit-driven 
data techniques that private companies develop over the next 
twenty-five years likely will be of some use in designing the tax 
system, but quite different techniques also would have to be 
developed to make tax surveillance feasible.  
The primary problem the Tax Surveillance System would 
face is developing a system sufficiently intelligent to identify 
tax-relevant information and issues and to find, interpret, and 
apply the appropriate law. The system would not only need to 
surveil a taxpayer’s purchases, but also to determine the 
likelihood that the purchase was related to the taxpayer’s 
business and, if so, whether it should deducted or 
capitalized. 166  Even these basic issues can challenge an 
experienced tax professional; automating a process to do this 
work may be impossible. Any undertaking to “automate” legal 
decision-making is tremendously complex and requires 
multiple types of expertise. When automating legal decision-
making, programmers must make decisions in order to 
interpret the law and then translate it into computer code, and 
they almost always lack the legal and policy expertise to do 
this. 167  Even if a programmer has the requisite expertise, 
computer codes have a more limited vocabulary than the law.168 
The combination of this limited expertise and limited 
vocabulary has led to substantial distortions of the law when 
decision-making has been automated in other areas. 169  And 
coding tax law would be especially complex. The complexity of 
tax law is notorious.170 For example, some provisions require 
not only interpreting text, but also interpreting Congressional 
assumptions and purposes.171 In the tax context, basic issues 
are sometimes exceptionally complicated; in the coding world, 
even basic factual issues, like correctly identifying individuals, 
                                                 
166  Compare I.R.C. § 162 (West 2014) with I.R.C. § 263 (West 2014). 
167  Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1261 (2008). 
168  Id. 
169  Id. at 1255-62 (arguing that mistakes of this type led to hundreds of 
thousands of incorrect benefits determinations in the Colorado public 
benefits system to hundreds of thousands of incorrect benefits 
determinations). 
170  Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, 
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of 
the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 806 (1989) 
(describing the I.R.C. as the “‘lengthiest, most complex, most internally 
interrelated statute on the books today”). 
171  Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (as amended in 1960) (providing that non-
recognition provisions are “not available either beyond the words or the 
underlying assumptions and purposes” of the provision). 
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have posed significant problems for automation projections.172 
Consider how complicated identifying the taxpayer becomes in 
the partnership context. Although a partnership has a 
taxpayer identification number, earns income, and pays 
expenses, those items of income and deductions are allocated to 
the partners to be reported under their own taxpayer 
identification numbers.173 These allocations may not follow the 
same formula for each item, and, as a further complication, the 
formulae may not be set at the time the underlying transaction 
occurs.174 
 But tax law is not only complex—it is uncertain. The 
length and detail of the Code notwithstanding, there is limited 
and conflicting authority on many points of law. How would the 
Tax Surveillance System be designed to manage such legal 
complexity and uncertainty? It may be that, absent substantial 
tax reform as discussed in Section III, it simply could not be 
done. 
Another technological problem that would impede 
development of a Tax Surveillance System is the security of the 
system. First, the system would need to be secured from 
inappropriate manipulation by the taxpayer. Second, the 
information would need to be secured from inappropriate 
access by IRS and other government employees. History has 
shown such inappropriate access to be a recurring problem.175 
Third, the information—and its revelation of maps of activities 
and webs of relationships—would need to be secured from 
hackers with various motivations: those interested in identity 
theft; those interested in espionage; and those interested in 
detecting vulnerabilities in order to extract payment. 176 
                                                 
172  For example, identification problems in the automated no-fly lists are 
notorious—and difficult to correct. Citron, supra note 167, at 1273-75. 
173  See I.R.C. § 701 (West 2014) (Partners, Not Partnership, Subject to Tax). 
174  See id. § 702 (Income and Credits of Partner). 
175 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-337, 
INFORMATION SECURITY: IRS NEEDS TO CONTINUE IMPROVING CONTROLS 
OVER FINANCIAL AND TAXPAYER DATA (2015); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer 
Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 UNIV. KANSAS L. REV. 1065, 1102-03 
(2003). 
176 For discussion of the range of contemporary data security threats, see 
Robert Beckhusen, Pentagon Warns: ‘Pervasive’ Industrial Spying Targets 
U.S. Space Tech, WIRED, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/ 
12/space-espionage; Andy Greenberg, Kevin Mitnick, Once the World’s 
Most Wanted Hacker, Is Now Selling Zero-Day Exploits, WIRED,  
Sept. 27, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/09/kevin-mitnick-selling-zero-
day-exploits; Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is a Zero Day?, WIRED, 
Nov. 11, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero-day; and Kim 
Zetter, How to Protect Yourself From Big Bank-Card Hacks, WIRED, 
Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/09/avoid-bank-card-breach-
hassle.  
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Technologically securing the system would be no small design 
feat and would be essential to such a system’s feasibility.177 
A workable Tax Surveillance System would not drop into 
place fully formed. Implementing such a massive program 
would have to be piecemeal. The sequencing of program pieces 
would be important not only for technical purposes,178 but also 
for educating taxpayers and training government employees. 
Acknowledging that the practicalities would require such a 
system to arrive gradually makes its arrival more plausible. 
Consider the incremental steps such a system might take.  
The first step might be merely greatly expanding third-
party reporting requirements. As discussed above, these are 
essential to tax administration, 179  are widespread, and are 
increasing.180  Both the IRS Commissioner and the National 
Taxpayer Advocate have envisioned widespread electronic 
reporting of information by third parties to the IRS as a means 
to reduce the compliance burden and the compliance gap. This 
information would be reported to a site, which would then 
provide the information to taxpayers.  
A second step might be the integration of private return 
preparation services into the project on a voluntary basis.  
A very pale version of this already exists insofar as some 
taxpayers use return preparation software that downloads 
information from third parties. 181  These companies might  
next develop ways to reduce their taxpayer-customer’s record-
keeping requirements throughout the year by monitoring their 
location and travels, online activities, and electronic payment 
transactions, electronically recording relevant information to 
                                                 
177  The current system has become an appealing target—and is a  
vulnerable one. Jada F. Smith, Cyberattack Exposes I.R.S. Tax  
Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
05/27/business/breach-exposes-irs-tax-returns.html?ref=business&_r=0. 
178 In Colorado, the failure to test run the automated benefits system led to 
disastrous consequences. Citron, supra note 167, at 1273-75. 
179  Compliance for items for which there is a third-party reporting 
requirement is about double what it is for items without third party 
reporting. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 
2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 285-86, http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/ 
National-Taxpayer-Advocate's-2011-Annual-Report-to-Congress. 
180 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6050W (West 2014) (creating obligation for third parties, 
such as credit card companies and Paypal, to report transactions 
exceeding certain thresholds); see also Byron M. Huang, Walking the 
Thirteenth Floor:The Taxation of Virtual Economies, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
224,  264-65 (2015) (describing how information reporting from services 
like Paypal can be used to increase compliance with taxes in an online 
context) 
181 See, e.g., Import Fidelity Tax Information into Turbo Tax, FIDELITY, 
https://www.fidelity.com/taxes/turbotax-discount/import (last visited Apr. 
13, 2015) (showing that Turbo Tax and similar products already allow 
downloading from third parties). 
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address issues not covered by the payor-payee relationship 
usually found in third-party reporting situations.  
Both expanding third-party reporting requirements and 
integrating private return preparation services might cover a 
great many individuals, including those whose tax-relevant 
information is mostly already subject to third-party reporting 
obligations, those who claim only the standard deductions,  
and those who use tax return preparation software that 
electronically files the return with the IRS. With facilitation  
by the IRS, third-party information reporters and return-
preparation software designers could cooperate and achieve a 
significant reduction in these taxpayers’ compliance burden. 
But these taxpayers—the ones with a high level of information 
being reported by third parties and claiming only the standard 
deduction—already have a low compliance burden. And they 
already have a high compliance rate.  
Ultimately, it is the taxpayers with low levels of third-
party-reported information and low levels of compliance that 
must be included if the Tax Surveillance System is to serve its 
purposes. It is this project that would require extraordinary 
technological developments, not only with respect to gathering 
the information but, more so, with respect to the artificial legal 
intelligence necessary to use the information. As a practical 
matter, discussed in the next Section, this would require 
substantive tax reform in order to fit the law’s information 
requirements into what can be best gathered and processed 
with the new technology. 
3. Political Feasibility 
Ultimately, the arrival of a Tax Surveillance System would 
not be so much a matter of technological capability as it would 
be of political will. Political forces could modify the law to fit 
within the technological capabilities that emerge over the next 
twenty-five years. Yet, like technological feasibility, only time 
will tell whether such a system could become politically 
feasible.  
Senator Orrin Hatch identified the most politically 
sensitive issue when addressing the Senate Finance 
Committee. He pointed out that the “government could close 
the tax gap entirely by putting IRS agents in every family’s 
living room and in every small business,” but, he said, “this is a 
price that a liberty loving people, and their representatives, are 
rightly unwilling to pay.”182 Politically, how would the benefits 
of lowering the compliance burden and closing the compliance 
                                                 
182 Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration, Statement of Sen. 
Hatch, supra note 128. 
  THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 17 348
gap be balanced with concerns over the electronic equivalent of 
IRS agents in every family’s living room?  
It is not clear how the anti-tax political forces would react 
to such a proposal. Closing the tax gap, as Senator Hatch said, 
is the “great white whale” of deficit reduction. Collecting all of 
what is owed rather than only a fraction of it obviously would 
allow rates to be lowered without lowering the revenue 
collected. The anti-tax political forces articulate their concerns 
in both economic terms183 and philosophical objections.184 Those 
motivated by economic concerns generally oppose the current 
income tax base or current rates. They are convinced that the 
structure of one, the other, or both undermines economic 
growth. Those whose anti-tax sentiment is more ideological, on 
the other hand, are committed to reducing the federal 
government. And that commitment presumably would be 
threatened at least as much, if not more, by federal 
surveillance programs as by federal taxing and spending. 
Ultimately, the Tax Surveillance System debate would 
become a matter for popular support or resistance. Would 
voters be more motivated by the appeal of a lower deficit, easier 
compliance, and significant tax reform, or by fear of widespread 
surveillance? The strong libertarian impulse among some 
Americans185  would be at odds with moving towards a Tax 
Surveillance System, regardless of the appeal to change details 
of the tax system. Indeed, the words “Tax Surveillance System” 
may conjure nightmares. 186  But popular opposition may be 
broader than political libertarianism. Many might be opposed 
to the “surveillant symbiosis” between government and big 
companies that may lead to the rise of the “surveillance-
industrial complex.”187 
                                                 
183 Mitt Romney is one example of this. See Brian Montopoli, Analysis: 
Romney Tax Plan Strongly Favors the Rich, CBS NEWS, Mar. 2, 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/analysis-romney-tax-plan-strongly-favors-
the-rich (“Romney and his Republican allies have long argued that tax 
cuts will stimulate the economy”). 
184 One example of this is Grover Norquist, who said “I don't want to abolish 
government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into 
the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.” John P. Avlon, Republicans 
Wisely Break with Grover Norquist, CNN, Nov. 28, 2012, http://www.cnn 
.com/2012/11/26/opinion/avlon-grover-norquist. 
185 Aaron Blake, Poll: 22 Percent of Americans Lean Libertarian,  
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/10/29/poll-22-percent-of-americans-lean-libertarian 
(reporting that twenty-two percent of Americans lean libertarian). 
186 For some Christians, it might especially be a nightmare if the surveillance 
involved biometric technology, which would dovetail with the apocalyptic 
narrative of Mark of the Beast (a physically imprinted number for 
commercial transactions). Revelation 13:14-17. 
187 For perhaps the first use of this term, see JAY STANLEY, ACLU, THE 
SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS 
CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION  
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While anti-surveillance sentiment may be strong and could 
eventually triumph, as a practical matter, most Americans are 
not very motivated to resist being monitored.188 It may be that 
within the next twenty-five years, surveillance for tax 
compliance purposes will come to be seen as no big deal. The 
Tax Surveillance System agenda seems most likely to be 
settled by events, not debates. If Americans continue to be 
habituated to surrender privacy for services, and if doing so 
continues to seem risk-free,189 then the burden-free compliance 
service offered through tax surveillance likely will be seen as 
acceptable. If, however, Americans begin to experience more 
harms from surrendering their privacy, resistance to increased 
surveillance seems more likely. Widespread actual harms may 
convince Americans to protect their personal information. 
These harms may come in a number of forms: credit and cash 
access problems caused by data breaches; automated mistakes 
with irreparable consequences; weariness with the psychic 
weight of ongoing surveillance; shifts in power between the 
police and the policed; incidents of stalkers, kidnappers, and 
murderers taking advantage of electronically accessible 
personal information. Or, it may be a handful of incidences of 
terrorists or enemy states doing so.190 Unless the incidents and 
awareness of actual privacy harm become widespread, the 
impulse to exchange personal information for personal 
convenience likely will continue to grow unchecked. And if this 
continues, it seems likely that within twenty-five years, the 
                                                                                                             
OF A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2004), http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ 
surveillance_report.pdf. 
While many Americans express concern for their privacy, only a very 
small number say they have actually changed their behavior to avoid 
being tracked. Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 20, 2015), http://www.pew 
internet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-
surveillance. 
189 Currently, people see the internet of things as a “gee-whiz phenomenon.” 
Later, they will begin to consider potential problems, like the ability of a 
hacker to take control of an internet-of-things-connected house or car. Or 
they might begin to wonder, “why is my toaster spying on me?” Bilton, 
supra note 162. 
190 See ISIS Uses Social Media to Target Military Families, KTAR NEWS,  
Oct. 2, 2014, http://ktar.com/95/1771653/ISIS-uses-social-media-to-target-
military-families (reporting that the Army Threat Integration Center 
released a bulletin warning military families and listing precautions to 
take); ISIS Threat at Home: FBI Warns US Military About Social Media 
Vulnerabilities, ABC NEWS, Dec. 1, 2014 (providing warning from security 
agencies to military members to scrub social media accounts of 
information that might be used to target them); As ISIS Threats Online 
Persist, Military Families Rethink Online Lives,  CNN, Mar. 23, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/23/us/online-threat-isis-us-troops (reporting 
military members and their family members’ concern over use of online 
media information to target them). 
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tradeoff between surveillance and lower deficit, tax reform, and 
burden-free compliance will favor surveillance. 
III.  Discussing, Debating, and Researching Surveillance and 
Taxation 
In Part I, I described the current system for reporting 
taxpayer information to the IRS and the information-related 
compliance burden and gap problems. In Part II, I predicted 
that, over the next twenty-five years the IRS will be among the 
agencies and private companies trying to capture the growing 
gush of data. In this Part, I recommend several lines of 
research, discussion, and debate about the IRS’s pursuit of the 
data gush. The recommendations relate to protecting taxpayer 
privacy and autonomy, determining the extent of legal 
authority and constitutional limits and the need to coordinate 
various statues, and the substantive reform that would be 
necessary to create tax law that would be well served by a Tax 
Surveillance System. 
A. Privacy and Autonomy 
The prospect of a Tax Surveillance System raises 
significant concerns about the privacy of taxpayers. A great 
deal of the research agenda concerning how the information 
technology revolution should affect tax administration must 
focus on protecting the privacy of the taxpayers, even while 
gathering and analyzing all of their tax-relevant information. 
Some part of the solution to these problems would be reducing 
and refining what is considered tax relevant. But even within 
the settled-upon scope of information that is necessary to 
collect, the agenda should determine how best to design a 
surveillance system that values taxpayer privacy.  
Privacy is most commonly understood by scholars to be an 
individual’s interest in how his or her personal information is 
collected, processed, and used.191 If privacy is the interest in 
regulating the flow of personal information, the information 
revolution’s shrinking of how much information can be kept 
secret does not mean that “the age of privacy is over.” 192 
Rather, it means it is the beginning of an age in which privacy 
is more important than ever. The more personal information is 
collected, processed, and used, the more important an 
individual’s interest in managing how this happens. Regarding 
privacy merely as the ability of an individual to keep 
information secret obscures rather than reveals what is most 
                                                 
191  Daniel Solove describes the “control” theory of privacy as one of 
thepredominant contemporary theories of privacy and one traceable to 
John Locke. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1109-1115 (2002). 
192  Richards & King, supra note 146, at 409 (quoting Mark Zuckerberg). 
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pressing about privacy and the information technology 
revolution.  
Of course, the interest in controlling personal information 
was not generated by a technological revolution. Controlling 
personal information has always helped us regulate our social 
relationships and exercise our individual autonomy. Through 
controlling what we reveal to others, we control the degree of 
intimacy.193 Our most intimate relationships tend to be those in 
which we have shared a “slow process of mutual revelation.”194 
In social settings, privacy is our claim on controlling 
information about ourselves. It is valued in that it guides the 
development of our personal relationships.195 Privacy is also 
valued because it provides “breathing room” for the 
development of our own personhood. 196  It is within this 
breathing room—this zone of privacy—that we are able to 
“develop and exercise” meaningful autonomy. 197  Without 
privacy, we self-censor, suffer embarrassment, become 
inhibited, and experience “powerlessness, vulnerability, and 
dehumanization.”198 
But privacy is not an individualistic value. Protecting 
autonomous zones in which individuals can flourish with 
limited intrusiveness benefits society. 199  Protecting  
an individual’s autonomy redounds to the benefit of a free  
society through the flourishing of expression, innovation, 
experimentation, reflective citizenship, and a vital culture.200 
Without privacy protection, individual activities that 
contribute to the greater public good are impeded.201 A free 
society “ignores privacy at its peril.”202  
A substantial part of the research agenda related to 
taxation and surveillance should be dedicated to determining 
how to gather and analyze tax-relevant information without 
losing the public good of privacy. How should a system be 
designed to harvest the right information while respecting 
privacy zones in which taxpayers have breathing room and are 
not dehumanized or made powerless? How can taxpayers be 
sufficiently surveilled to gather the right information without 
                                                 
193  Solove, supra note 191, at 1121. 
194  Id. (quoting Jeffrey Rosen). 
195  Id. 
196  Cohen, supra note 139, at 1906. 
197  Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:  Informational Privacy and the Subject 
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2000). 
198  Solove, supra note 17, at 1398. 
199 See Daniel J. Solove, ‘I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other 
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 762-64 (2007). 
200  Cohen, supra note 139, at 1905-1907. 
201  See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 PENN L. REV. 477, 488 
(2006). 
202  Cohen, supra note 139, at 1905-6. 
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sacrificing innovation, citizenship, and culture? These are not 
so much questions for legal experts as for psychologists, 
anthropologists, and philosophers.  
One of the difficulties of addressing these questions is that 
the cultural norms as to privacy zones are being transformed 
by the information technology revolution. It may be that what 
would be necessary to comfort taxpayers in 2015 is radically 
different from what will be necessary in 2040. With that in 
mind, perhaps research will reveal that implementing the 
system through steps appropriate for the relevant time is the 
best way forward, presuming that what is appropriate will 
change with time. Perhaps, as suggested above, the first steps 
might be taken with respect to the information already 
reported by third parties, as taxpayers are already conditioned 
to have little control over this information. Perhaps the next 
step might be a voluntary program providing a reduced 
compliance burden in exchange for a greater degree of 
surveillance. By making the sacrifice of privacy a matter of 
taxpayer choice, a taxpayer’s interest in controlling personal 
information could be respected. Then, maybe, the next step 
would be to allow taxpayers to choose between two tax systems, 
one in which less information is collected but certain benefits 
are not available, and one in which more information is 
collected and more benefits are available. For example, in the 
simplified system, there might be fewer potential benefits for 
higher education expenses but no need to monitor, for example, 
the taxpayer’s degree progress. 203  Or perhaps the taxpayer 
should be empowered to opt out of surveillance at certain times 
or in certain situations, with the provision that there would be 
no tax benefits available for expenses. For example, a taxpayer 
might be able to opt out of surveillance of travel with the 
consequence that none of the travel expenses would be 
deductible, even if they otherwise would have been. By putting 
the taxpayer in the control of the surveillance, the taxpayer 
would control his or her personal information and be able to 
define his or her privacy zones. The design problem would be to 
balance these options for the taxpayer with the tax system’s 
interest in collecting all of the relevant information.  
At some point, empirical research into exactly what 
concerns taxpayers and how those concerns might be addressed 
would be needed. For example, if research determines that 
taxpayers are most concerned about their personal information 
being misconstrued, then procedures to ensure accurate 
analysis might address the concern. If research reveals a great 
                                                 
203  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(B) (West 2014) (precluding Hope and Lifetime 
Learning Credits to cover the expenses related to courses involving sports, 
games, or hobbies unless the course is part of the student’s degree 
program). 
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concern that the information not be misused, leaked, or  
hacked, then measures to reduce the chances of misuse or 
inappropriate dissemination would be the appropriate solution. 
Research might determine that there is concern that 
information would be used by agencies other than the IRS, in 
which case the legal restrictions on the secondary use of 
information by other agencies may need to be strengthened.204 
Such use is already limited, but so is the scope of the 
information to which the  
IRS has access. It may be that social research reveals that 
what matters to taxpayers is not so much the control of all 
personal information, but rather the control of certain types of 
information. Presumably, taxpayers care less about controlling 
the information about their paychecks, since their employers 
already know the amount, than they do in controlling 
information about their health, even though their doctors are 
also privy to that knowledge. Protecting taxpayers’ privacy 
means designing a system that values whatever  
it is that taxpayers value when assessing the flow of their  
personal information. It would mean designing a system in 
which taxpayers feel neither dehumanized nor powerless.  
It would be important to surveil taxpayers without making 
them less expressive and innovative. The risk of surveillance is 
that it reduces creativity, expression, and innovation.205 Over 
the next twenty-five years, these negative consequences may 
diminish as cultural norms develop to reflect the new 
information technology. Of course, since surveillance for any 
number of purposes will increase, concern for creativity, 
expression, and innovation is not tax-specific. Yet, to the extent 
that the tax system would be focused on surveilling 
economically significant activities, policy makers should think 
about how to limit economic chilling effects. If a business owner 
is unduly sensitive to the tax surveillance system, such that 
she spends less on a business development dinner than she 
otherwise would, then the restaurant and waitstaff would earn 
less than they would earn in a world without tax surveillance. 
More pervasively and more perniciously, if business owners 
take fewer risks, incline  
their business decisions towards safety, and temper their 
entrepreneurial aspirations, the economy as a whole  
might suffer. Surveilling economic activity could have the 
consequence of chilling innovative economic activity.206  
                                                 
204  See Solove, supra note 201, at 521-22. 
205 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 139, at 271; Gray & Citron, Total 
Surveillance, supra note 4, at 271; Richards, supra note 4, at 1948-50;  
Solove, supra note 191, at 1145-46. 
206  Interestingly, but not too surprisingly, when some individual income tax 
return information was made public for a short period early in the 
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How would the Tax Surveillance System affect the 
taxpayer’s sense of citizenship? The pervasiveness of the 
surveillance system could potentially make Americans more 
aware of federal tax needs, laws, and politics. Indeed, the 
system could be structured so that taxpayers are able to 
provide ongoing feedback—communicating to the IRS as 
taxpayers and to their elected representatives as voters. 
Perhaps such a system would facilitate the broadening and 
deepening of civic involvement of taxpayers, and improve 
democratic participation. Or, it might have the opposite effect. 
The movement towards the IRS pre-preparing income tax 
returns has been criticized on grounds relevant to tax 
surveillance: by making tax compliance less burdensome, 
taxpayers may lose an important connection to the tax system. 
For some commentators, the concern is that taxpayers would 
be less politically inclined to resist tax increases.207 For other 
commentators, the concern is a more general one about citizens 
and their awareness of the laws and fulfillment of their 
duties. 208  Becoming an object of ongoing government 
surveillance no doubt affects how a citizen relates to his or her 
democratic government, and how that relationship is likely to 
be affected should be a seriously considered. 
The effect of the Tax Surveillance System on a taxpayer’s 
sense of citizenship would be complicated because the 
surveillance system would not present itself as a “government” 
system. In fact, there is no system of “government” 
surveillance. Surveillance is a “linked, shared, and integrated” 
project of both government agencies and private companies.209 
A Tax Surveillance System would not be a system independent 
of all others. It would be the integration of tax administration 
systems into the existing, integrated surveillance 
infrastructure.  Currently, even if a citizen’s online life 
mediated through companies such as Google, Facebook, 
Wikipedia, Amazon, and Youtube is monitored by government 
agencies, for most citizens, awareness of the monitoring is at a 
low level or, at least, a low concern. However, if the monitoring 
                                                                                                             
twentieth century, one effect was increased investment in the tax-exempt 
securities market. The publicity thus decreased the revenue collectible 
from the income tax. This impact on economic behavior was one of the 
reasons the Treasury Department opposed publicizing individual income 
tax information. Cost of Publicity Scored in Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 
1925, at 1. 
207  President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Transcript of Ninth 
Meeting, Implementing a Return-Free Tax Filing Scheme (May 17, 2005), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/meetings/meeting-
05172005.html (testimony of Grover Norquist). 
208  Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues 
of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 56-65 (2007). 
209 Gray & Citron, Total Surveillance, supra note 4, at 262. 
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were used to determine tax liabilities, the awareness and 
concern would be quite different. Receiving a tax return each 
year reflecting surveilled activities would no doubt increase a 
taxpayer’s self-awareness and would probably affect his or her 
behavior. Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, Amazon, Youtube and 
innumerable other companies would mediate the taxpayer’s 
relationship to government. Integrating tax administration 
into the joint surveillance system would mean integrating  
one’s sense of being a citizen and a consumer, and the likely 
consequences of fusing these and related roles should be a topic 
of considerable discussion. 
The cooperation between government and private 
companies in surveilling citizens also raises issues of personal 
autonomy. Private sector designs increasingly focus on the 
virtual space in which consumers interact with the company’s 
data collection system in order to gather more information 
about the consumer than the consumer is aware he or she is 
providing. They do this in order to exploit the consumer’s 
personal vulnerabilities for company profit. 210  Even if the 
information gathered by such methods were within the legal 
authority of the IRS, such collection methods raise 
tremendously important issues about citizenship and 
governance in a free society. It may be quite effective to exploit 
a taxpayer’s vulnerabilities in order to extract the most useful 
tax-relevant information. And it may even be legal. But there 
should be considerable debate about the appropriateness  
in a free society of the government exploiting taxpayers’ 
vulnerabilities to gather tax-relevant information well beyond 
what the individual likely believes he or she is disclosing. 
Yet, what may look like exploiting a taxpayer’s 
vulnerabilities from one perspective may look like merely 
personalizing a system in a helpful way from another 
perspective. It may be that the system could be designed in a 
personalized way to increase a taxpayer’s own rationality with 
respect to tax savings. Perhaps one taxpayer would be best 
motivated by retirement account contributions, with a 
spreadsheet of information; another by feedback delivered 
through a digitized human face;211 and another by a few lines of 
a favorite song while filling out a form. The techniques that 
may discern a taxpayer’s vulnerabilities for manipulation 
might be used to steer the taxpayer towards a lower tax 
liability. But it is not merely whether the technology would be 
                                                 
210 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995, 
1003-05, 1013-15, and 1033. 
211  See generally Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake:  A New Dimension to 
Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010) 
(considering how technologies that imitate human features implicate 
privacy values). 
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used to increase or decrease a taxpayer’s liability that should 
be of concern, but also whether the taxpayer would appreciate 
the way in which he or she was being monitored and 
manipulated by a government agency. 
The concern over how surveillance would affect individual 
taxpayers should also consider the technological intrusiveness 
of the system into the taxpayer’s life. Technological 
intrusiveness saps a person’s time, attention, and energy by 
interrupting his or her activities and sense of solitude.212 There 
are great variations among individuals with respect to 
sensitivities to technological intrusiveness. Relative to a college 
student, a retired executive might have a greater potential for 
ever-increasing tax rationality. Yet, the college student might 
have a higher threshold for technological intrusiveness. An 
Amish business owner213 might have considerable interest in 
seeking out tax savings, but, given the sect’s resistance to 
technologies widely used by other Americans, he or she 214 
presumably would resist technological intrusions. Not only are 
there individual variations in sensitivities across individuals, 
but the same individual’s sensitivities may vary over short 
periods. For example, a Sabbath observer would resist any 
involvement or intrusiveness once a week, no matter his or her 
preferences on the other six days. The Tax Surveillance System 
should be designed to respect the autonomy of individuals as 
members of a free and diverse society. Yet it would also need to 
be effective. The Sabbath observing taxpayer should be given a 
day of rest from technological intrusiveness. But the design to 
accommodate this weekly rest should not provide a weekly 
opening for tax evasion. 
B. Legal Authority and Limits  
A Tax Surveillance System legal research agenda should 
address how best to reform the substantive tax law to fit 
privacy concerns and technological capabilities and should seek 
to determine the limits of the IRS’s information-gathering 
authority. The latter raises many of the same issues that any 
widespread government surveillance operation would, but 
should be framed within the broad authority of the IRS to 
require and inspect records maintained by the taxpayer and to 
compel third parties to provide information to the IRS. 
                                                 
212  See  Solove, supra note 201, at 553-555. 
213  For a discussion of the success of Amish business owners, see generally 
DONALD B. KRAYBILL & STVEN M. KNOLT, AMISH ENTERPRISE: FROM PLOWS 
TO PROFITS (1995). 
214 Although the Amish maintain traditional gender roles, Amish women 
often run businesses. In some instances, their businesses have been so 
successful that their husbands have dropped their other employment to 
work in the wives’ businesses. Id. at 240-44. 
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One issue to be resolved is whether the current grant of the 
right to require and inspect records would be sufficient to allow 
the IRS to require participation in a surveillance system that 
automatically generated records for IRS inspection. Of course, 
it is Congress rather than the IRS that would devise a Tax 
Surveillance System, modifying whatever laws would be 
necessary to authorize its implementation. Nevertheless, such 
widespread information gathering may already be within the 
scope of authority granted to the IRS, given that it is so 
broad.215 
Another line of research should inquire into how much 
information the IRS might be able to obtain from third parties 
such as Facebook. The IRS has the authority to summon 
information from knowledgeable third parties.216 In practice, 
the information is provided by third parties merely after an 
informal request by the IRS. 217  While Facebook has not 
publicized how many requests for information it has received 
from the IRS, it has publicized that it produced information in 
response to over 35,000 requests from U.S. government 
agencies in the past year.218 If a third party refuses to comply 
with the informal request, the IRS can formally summons the 
party and seek to compel production of the information in 
federal court.219 Under current law, the burden on the IRS is 
not high. It need only act in good faith and issue the summons 
for a legitimate purpose. 220 There is no need for the IRS to 
meet any standard of probable cause, but rather only to show 
that “inquiry may be relevant” and that the IRS does not 
already have the information.221  
                                                 
215  See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text; see also generally Part I.A. 
216  See Part II.A. 
217  I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West 2014); MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 
47.02[1]. 
218 United States Law Enforcement Requests for Data, FACEBOOK, 
https://govt 
requests.facebook.com/country/United States/2014-H2 (last visited Apr. 
13, 2015). 
219  I.R.C. § 7602(a) (West 2014); MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 
47.02[1]. 
220  United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964); MCMAHON AND 
ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 47.02[2].  
221  The court in Powell stated: 
[T]he Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable 
cause to obtain enforcement of his summons. . . . He must 
show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a 
legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the 
purpose, that the information sought is not already within 
the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative 
steps required by the Code have been followed. It is the 
court's process which is invoked to enforce the 
administrative summons and a court may not permit its 
process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the 
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Would taxpayers have any Fifth Amendment argument 
against participating in the Tax Surveillance System? The 
Fifth Amendment provides limited protection in the tax 
system. It is not a defense for failing to file an income tax 
return, even when, for example, the taxpayer is engaged in an 
illegal business. However, the taxpayer may claim the privilege 
as to “the specific questions for which a valid privilege exists,” 
so long as the taxpayer completes “the remainder of the 
form.” 222  Tax-relevant records that have been voluntarily 
prepared by the taxpayer have not been compelled and thus do 
not qualify for Fifth Amendment protection.223 However, the 
acts of “gathering, identifying, and authenticating” the  
tax relevant records may be testimonial and, therefore, 
privileged. 224  How should this apply when tax records are 
automatically generated by and reported to the IRS?  
The broad scope of the IRS’s authority to gather 
information and its constitutional limitations have not been 
considered in light of the technological capacity to gather all 
that is allowed. The issues raised by “broad, indiscriminate, 
and continuous” surveillance225 are far-reaching and deep.  In 
fact, they are not unique to surveillance for tax purposes. Legal 
scholars have already discussed similar issues in national 
security and criminal investigations.226 But the Supreme Court 
has only begun to consider how the information-technology 
revolution affects constitutional rights. In light of United  
States v. Jones, a case in which the Court considered law 
enforcement’s use of a GPS-tracking device on a suspect’s car, 
there is reason to anticipate that, in future cases, several 
Justices will focus on the quantities of information gathered.227 
If the Supreme Court becomes interested in this “quantitative 
privacy,” 228  any widespread government surveillance system 
would be implicated, including tax surveillance. 
                                                                                                             
summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as 
to harass the taxpayer. 
 379 U.S. at 57-58; see also MCMAHON AND ZELENAK, supra note 30, ¶ 
47.02[2].  
222  WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 77, § 19:93; see also Garner v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (finding incriminating disclosures of gambling 
made on tax return to be admissible evidence).  
223  United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (holding that because a 
taxpayer had voluntarily prepared the records, their production was not 
compulsory under the Fifth Amendment).  
See TOWNSEND ET AL., supra note 77, at 238.  
225 Citron & Gray, Total Surveillance, supra note 4, at 269. 
226  See id.; see also, e.g., Richards, supra note 4, at 1934. 
227  Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 4, at 68 (citing United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012)). 
228  Id. 
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Another constitutional issue raised by this type of 
surveillance concerns the exercise of fundamental rights. We 
know that surveillance chills behavior. Surveillance for tax 
purposes could chill constitutionally protected behavior. For 
example, when a woman exercises her constitutional right to 
an abortion, the abortion’s potential as a deductible medical 
expense means that various details—such as the gestational 
age of the fetus—would be tax-relevant information. 229 
Knowing the IRS was collecting this information might chill 
her choice. Currently, the IRS is entitled to such information, 
but it is unlikely that it would actually be collected or used for 
two reasons. First, it is very unlikely many women know of the 
potential tax relevance of the information. If a woman does not 
know it is subject to IRS review, it cannot chill her choice. 
Second, none of the information would ever be requested by the 
IRS unless the deduction were taken (less than seven percent 
of returns),230  the return audited (less than one percent),231 
and, even then, only if the particular deduction were 
questioned. However, under a Tax Surveillance System, the 
monitoring of medical expenses would be routine. Would the 
potential chilling of fundamental rights mean that the 
surveillance system would have to be limited in substantial 
ways? 
Of course, the Constitution is not the only body of law 
guiding development of a Tax Surveillance System. We ought 
to think about how the system would interact with existing 
statutes outside of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, 
especially as to the information flow gathered from or through 
third parties, the System’s design may need to be coordinated 
with various statutory schemes: the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970, 232  the Privacy Act of 1974, 233  the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978,234 the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986, 235  the Computer Matching and Privacy Act of 
                                                 
229 Only the expenses of legal abortions are deductible. Given the variation of 
state laws, legality of the abortion would have to be determined on a 
state-by-state basis, which would require consideration of gestational age. 
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(last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
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233  5 U.S.C. § 522a (2013). 
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1988, 236  and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996.237 
Finally, research ought to be conducted on how other 
government agencies might seek to use the information 
collected through the Tax Surveillance System, and how this 
ought to be regulated. Under current law, government agencies 
are able to access information held by the IRS in certain 
situations.238 Should greatly increasing the information held by 
the IRS increase or decrease that access? Anticipating that 
there would be an increased information flow from the IRS to 
other agencies highlights the risk that the removal of 
information from the tax context increases the chances that 
this information will later be misunderstood.239 Even when the 
context is superficially relevant to tax administration, such as 
in economics or accounting, the tax-law meaning of a word like 
“income” is quite different than its meaning elsewhere. 240 
Words in the tax code often have technical meanings that are 
different than the casual interpretations. For instance, one’s 
“principal residence” may not be one’s home,241 and one’s child 
may not be one’s “dependent.”242 Characterization in tax law 
can also be at odds with other legal characterizations. For 
example, a limited liability company duly organized, operated, 
and recognized for all state law purposes may be non-existent 
for tax purposes, with its employees, income, and expenses 
appearing as its sole member’s own.243 Thus, the agenda should 
include not only debating the terms on which other agencies 
should be able to access the tax information, but also 
discussing how those agencies could accurately translate 
information from the tax context into their own.  
C. Tax Surveillance and Tax Reform 
A final set of research questions relate to reforming the tax 
law itself. The tax system we have is not designed for  
the information collecting and processing technologies now 
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developing. Changes in collection-related technology may make 
a tax system optimal in one year, but not indefinitely.244 A 
surveillance-facilitated tax system would be a paradigm shift in 
collection technology, and we should discuss how substantive 
tax law ought to be changed to accommodate the shift. We 
should not anticipate having the 2015 tax law administered by 
2040 technologies. So, what should the tax law in 2040 be, in 
light of these technologies? 
These new technologies hold potential for solving the 
compliance burden and gap problems. They also hold potential 
for undermining privacy and the goods it protects and 
promotes. But the administration of an income tax system 
inevitably requires disclosure of information we otherwise keep 
private. After all, we do not disclose our paycheck amounts to 
others, at least not widely or frequently. Indeed, discussions of 
money matters—even between spouses—tend to be taboo.245 
Yet, the income tax system depends on access to private 
information, and not only about one’s paycheck or business, but 
about one’s home, family, and health. Unavoidability justifies 
some privacy burden on taxpayers, but not any burden. Under 
the current system, only a minuscule amount of information to 
which the IRS is entitled is actually collected. This does not 
reflect a privacy policy, but rather other factors, especially the 
very low audit rate. While Congress has made all sorts  
of information tax relevant, and while the IRS has the  
legal authority to demand any tax-relevant information, the 
practical constraints on gathering and processing information 
have meant that people have had to give relatively little 
thought to the scope of tax-relevant information. But in a 
system in which all of the information that is relevant is 
gathered and processed, there should be considerably more 
concern to carefully define what is relevant. The upside of the 
Tax Surveillance System would be reducing the compliance gap 
and compliance burden by gathering and processing all of the 
relevant information; the downside would include the harms to 
taxpayer privacy, which currently is protected only by practical 
inabilities. 
A fundamental project in integrating tax policy and privacy 
policy should be assessing the current tax law in light of 
privacy concerns. We need to devise some way to measure the 
privacy burdens of the current tax law. Perhaps this begins 
with measuring the information collection that is already 
accepted without protest. This is primarily the third-party 
reported information already collected on almost all taxpayers, 
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such as paycheck and dividend amounts. 246  Reporting this 
information does not appear to undermine social good, perhaps 
because it involves dollar amounts paid to third parties or 
received from third parties without a cultural expectation of 
secrecy. This information is collected on most taxpayers, and it 
is collected routinely.  
The information routinely and universally collected should 
be compared to information that is collectible only in an audit. 
In an audit situation, the IRS has broad legal authority. As 
noted, the agency is entitled to any information that may be 
relevant to determining a tax liability.247 And it is during an 
audit that the most sensitive information is at risk. For 
example, an audit of dependent status might require the 
taxpayer to disclose how many nights of the year the child slept 
in the taxpayer’s house and how many elsewhere, 248  the 
citizenship of the child,249 and whether or not the child has any 
disabilities.250 If the audit covers adoption expenses, it might 
include information about the child’s special needs,251 surrogate 
parenting arrangements,252 and the legal relationship of the 
child to the taxpayer’s spouse.253  Under a Tax Surveillance 
System, all of this information, though rarely gathered now, 
would always be gathered on all taxpayers to determine if the 
taxpayer had qualifying dependents and how related expenses 
should be characterized. 
In thinking about this issue, we must not only examine the 
privacy burdens if all of the information relevant under current 
law were collected, but must also determine some way to 
balance the potential privacy harms against the benefits to the 
taxpayer and the tax system. While it is invasive to investigate  
the disabilities, special needs, or surrogate parenting 
arrangements of a child, the information may be essential to 
accurately measuring the degree of the child’s dependence on 
the taxpayer. The result of this accuracy includes benefits to 
the taxpayer, such as a credit against tax liabilities for 
amounts paid to adopt the child.254 Weight also has to be given 
to the potential for evasion by the taxpayer, since the purpose 
of the surveillance system would be to reduce the compliance 
gap while reducing the opportunities for evasion. 
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In this balancing, some current provisions likely would be 
difficult to justify, like the medical expense deduction. First, 
the deduction is not necessary for the accurate measurement of 
a taxpayer’s economic income.255 Second, collection of medical 
information tends to involve information that taxpayers would 
not routinely share outside of particular social circles. Third, 
not all expenses are deductible. For example, breast 
augmentation may or may not be deductible. If its purpose is 
merely to improve appearance, it is not deductible.256 However, 
if it is to ameliorate a deformity related to disease, then it is 
deductible.257 The invasiveness of medical care surveillance—
such as determining the circumstances of breast 
augmentations—would rarely be outweighed by the tax 
benefits to the patient given how few patients would have tax 
benefits from the medical care payments. No medical expense 
is deductible by those taxpayers claiming the standard 
deduction, which is the majority of taxpayers.258 Even among 
the minority who itemize, the deduction is only available when 
the total expenses exceed ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted 
gross income.259 The deduction is claimed on less than seven 
percent of returns.260 A tax system that routinely collected all 
medical information on all taxpayers, but that provided 
medical-related tax benefits in such limited situations, would 
be hard to justify.  
The exclusion of gain on the sale of the taxpayer’s principal 
residence is a more generous tax benefit.261 Like the medical 
expense deduction, this tax benefit is a deviation from the 
accurate measurement of income. 262  While the exclusion 
provides a significant tax benefit,263 determining whether or 
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not the sale qualifies could become quite invasive upon audit. 
For example, relevant information may include information 
related to multiple birth pregnancies,264 illnesses,265 loss of job 
or other change in job status266 of the taxpayer or someone 
living with the taxpayer,267 as well as where the taxpayer’s 
family members live, 268  the taxpayer’s banks, 269  and the 
identity and location of “religious organizations and 
recreational club with which the taxpayer is affiliated.” 270 
Routinely collecting this information would involve monitoring 
the health, employment profile, religious, and recreational 
habits of taxpayers. Would taxpayers prefer a system with that 
degree of monitoring, or would they prefer different tax 
consequences of the sale of a principal residence? Presuming 
that all relevant information is always collected invariably 
shifts our perspective. Given the low audit rate, the chances 
that a taxpayer would have to provide information on his or her 
banking, religious, and recreational habits is miniscule, even if 
the taxpayer claims the benefit of the exclusion of gain on the 
sale of the home. In practice, almost none of this information is 
ever disclosed to the IRS. The taxpayer does not even have to 
disclose to the IRS that he or she is claiming the exclusion.271 
However, if, under the Tax Surveillance System all of the 
information relevant under current law were actually collected, 
the balance of harms and benefits would shift, likely indicating 
that a number of provisions’ privacy burdens would not be 
offset by tax benefits. 
Researchers might contemplate ways to retain beneficial 
tax provisions while reducing their potential privacy burdens. 
It could be that a systematic review of the case law reveals that 
judges actually decide issues with reference to far fewer facts 
than the current Treasury Regulations cover. For example, it 
may be the case that, in disputes over whether a residence was 
a taxpayer’s principle residence, judges do not consider the 
proximity of the residence to a religious institution. Similarly, 
it may be that, even though one judge considers reading habits 
relevant in determining whether or not a taxpayer had a profit 
motive or a hobby motive while pursuing a particular 
activity,272 the best indication of a profit motive is actually the 
relative ratios of the activity’s expenses to the income derived 
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from the activity.273 It may be that the information technology 
revolution itself could be leveraged in this research. Big Data 
analyses may reveal patterns of relevance we would never 
discern on our own. 
In addition to privacy concerns, considerations of what new 
technology itself does best would be relevant to guiding the  
tax system into the technology revolution. It may be that 
incorporating artificial intelligence into tax administration 
means that tax law should be reformed to include more rules 
and fewer standards. Artificial intelligence is better suited for 
rule-making decisions. In some circumstances, it may be that 
moving towards rules and away from standards in order to 
allow greater room for computerizing legal processing is a 
sacrifice of fairness. In her review of legal automation projects, 
Danielle Citron concluded that “the emergence of automation 
threatens to” give rules “a huge, and often decisive, advantage 
on the basis of cost and convenience rather than the 
desirability of the substantive results they produce.” 274 
However, it may be that tax law in particular is better suited 
for a move towards more rules than some other bodies of law. 
While a system of artificial intelligence may accommodate a 
great deal of complexity, the complexity ultimately should not 
exceed what a taxpayer can understand and apply without 
undue difficulty. This issue is best considered in light of the 
taxpayer’s adversarial rights in the tax system. In the current 
tax system, the taxpayer is obligated to record relevant facts, 
interpret the relevant law, and apply it to the facts at hand in 
preparing the return. The taxpayer does not defend what she 
has done unless there is an audit and, ultimately, the defense 
is to a judge, not an IRS agent. For example, a taxpayer who 
takes a trip somewhat for business reasons and somewhat for 
personal reasons is obligated to rightly record the expenses of 
the trip but also to determine if the mixed-motive trip is 
primarily for business reasons or personal reasons.275 So long 
as the taxpayer believes she has a pretty good argument (one 
with “substantial authority”)276 that the mixed-motive trip was 
primarily for business reasons, she is entitled to deduct the 
expenses accordingly. Not only is she entitled to give herself 
the benefit of the doubt, but she is entitled to do so even if she 
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thinks a court likely would disagree.277 But in a surveillance-
based tax system, the system would collect the relevant data—
perhaps how many minutes were spent in the client’s office and 
how many minutes were spent in a friend’s house—and 
tentatively conclude whether the trip was more business 
related or personal. The return would be drafted on that basis, 
though the taxpayer would have right to dispute it and appeal 
to the judiciary. Of course, for the taxpayer to dispute it, she 
would have to be informed as to how the conclusion was 
formed. The system would have to reveal how the decision was 
made and how the legal authorities were interpreted and 
applied in a way that the taxpayer could understand and 
respond. This is a matter of what has been called “technological 
due process,” meaning that these sorts of automated decisions 
cannot be made within black boxes.278  
Ultimately, transparency must be found not only in the 
conclusions on individual taxpayer returns, but also in the 
design of the automated decision-making process. It would 
require a process with public notice, comments, and 
hearings. 279  Commenting on proposed Treasury Regulations 
requires tax expertise. But to comment on the process of coding 
the law and regulations would require not only tax expertise, 
but also some understanding of the computer coding process. 
Computer codes have a more limited vocabulary than the 
law.280 The combination of this limited expertise and limited 
vocabulary has led to substantial distortions of the law when 
decision-making has been automated in other areas.281  This 
makes the transparency of coding the project more important, 
in that independent tax experts need to be watching for such 
distortions. While tax experts may appreciate the complexities 
of the law and different understandings of how to resolve 
substantive legal uncertainties, they mostly cannot appreciate 
the complexities of the computer code and different ways of 
reflecting uncertainties in it. Part of the research agenda thus 
must be reconciling the complexities of the tax law and 
computer code, and doing so in a way that is transparent and 
subject to public review and comment. 
In light of these issues, it seems that the tax law of 2040 
should be fundamentally different than that of 2015 if 
revolutionary information technologies are to be integrated into 
its administration. What we must contemplate are not so much 
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the details of the current system and the challenges of 
updating and fitting it to cutting-edge technology, but the 
prospects for a tremendously reformed tax system. It probably 
would require tremendous reform to build a tax system that 
could be integrated with technology without unduly 
undermining taxpayer privacy and autonomy. The system best 
integrated with technology and most protective of privacy and 
autonomy might not be based on income. In the past, in 
isolated instances, tax base reform advocates have included 
tangential privacy considerations.282 However, compared to the 
current world where almost no individual taxpayers are 
audited, a future, technology-driven world should push privacy 
and autonomy concerns to the fore. 
While the IRS has always been an “information intensive 
enterprise,”283 it is the agency’s practical inabilities to collect 
and analyze all of the information relevant to a taxpayer’s 
liability that has protected taxpayer privacy. But, in a not too 
distant future, “every animate and inanimate object on 
earth”284 may generate data that the IRS is able to gather. Now 
seems like a good time to start the discussion.  
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